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INTRODUCTION

A large and growing body of law and psychology scholarship
has posed new challenges to traditional assumptions about the
behavior of legal actors. While mainstream legal thought has
often treated individuals as more or less rational, autonomous
actors,' scholars in a variety of fields are presenting a new,
empirically based, and more formal challenge to law's traditional
conceptions of human behavior. For example, the behavioral law
and economics movement has incorporated empirical findings of
systematic deviations from economically rational behavior,2 and
has suggested how taking account of these deviations might alter
' See Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, ContemporaryPsychology's Challenges to
Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2003) ("[Olur legal
institutions rest on the same rationalist assumptions about human inference and
decision making that underlie classic economics."). The growth of the law and
economics school sharpened this conception of human behavior, often applying the
more concrete assumptions of "rational choice" theory to actors in legal contexts. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); cf.
Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Futureof the Law, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 433, 436 ("The single most important contribution that law and economics has
made to the law is the use of a coherent theory of human decision-making ('rational
choice theory') to examine how people are likely to respond to legal rules."). Thus,
law and economics provided a tangible theory of human behavior that would
influence a generation of legal thought. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
& ECONOMICS 2 (5th ed. 2007) ("Economics has changed the nature of legal
scholarship, the common understanding of legal rules and institutions, and even the
practice of law.").
2 See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002);
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL
ECONOMICS (1991).
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our conceptions of legal actors. Situationists have looked to the
ways that individuals often fail to appreciate situational
influences on their own behavior and have argued for the
incorporation of their findings into the law.'
Similarly,
behavioral realists have called for legal analysis grounded in the

' See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000);
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). For examples
of behavioral law and economics scholarship, see BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George
Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism,"151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1211 (2003); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
PrecautionaryPrinciple,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995);
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract
Negotiation: The PsychologicalPower of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1583 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons
for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996); Bryan D. Lammon, Note, The Practical
Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary
Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101 (2007). For critiques of
behavioral law and economics, see, for example, Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus
Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 1781 (2003); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91
GEO. L.J. 67 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998).
4 See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character:A
CriticalRealist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004); Jon Hanson
& David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character,
CriticalRealism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).
For other examples of situationist literature, see Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson,
The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are
Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson,
Attributional Divide]; Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: Maintaining
False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499 (2008) [hereinafter
Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism]; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically
Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.CAL.
L. REV. 1103 (2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The
Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2004). A number of situationist scholars contribute to a blog, as well. See The
Situationist, http://thesituationist.wordpress.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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findings of social science5 and have given special attention to the
ways in which implicit bias might affect how we approach
antidiscrimination policy.' In these fields and others, law and
psychology is challenging the traditional conceptions of human
behavior that permeate much of the law and legal scholarship.7
One area with especially great potential is the use of
psychology to improve our understanding of one of the more
persistent questions of legal theory:
How do judges decide
cases?' Since the legal realists posed this question, legal scholars
have searched for the determinants of judicial behavior. Only a
few scholars have looked to modern psychology to understand
judicial behavior better.9 Perhaps most notably, Chris Guthrie,
I See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism
in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and DisparateTreatment, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 997 (2006).
6 For examples of behavioral realist scholarship, see Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, FairMeasures:A BehavioralRealist Revision of "AffirmativeAction," 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1063 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 5. For a critique of

arguments based on implicit bias, see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock,
AntidiscriminationLaw and the Perilsof Mindreading,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).
For a response to Mitchell and Tetlock, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias,
"Science,"and AntidiscriminationLaw, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477 (2007).
' Benforado and Hanson have suggested that there are no clear lines dividing
the various approaches to law and psychology, and they often overlap to some
extent. See Benforado & Hanson, Attributional Divide, supra note 4, at 315 n.3
(distinguishing the approaches of law and economics, behavioral law and economics,
critical realism, and behavioral realism).
8 While
the application of social and cognitive psychology to judicial
decisionmaking is relatively new, legal scholars in a variety of fields have long
debated how judges make decisions. As Dan Simon points out, and as discussed
briefly in Part IV, the integration of a psychological approach to judging can inform
and expand prior work on judicial decisionmaking. See Dan Simon, A Psychological
Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 22-32 (1998) [hereinafter
Simon, Psychological Model] (comparing his psychological model of judging to
related theories, including those of the Legal Realists and Critical Legal Scholars).
9 There is some debate as to whether general psychological findings
can be applied to the specific activity of judging. In particular, Frederick
Schauer has argued that we must first ascertain whether there
is a unique psychology of judging before applying the insights of modern
psychology
to
judicialdecisionmaking.
See
Frederick
F.
Schauer,
Is There a Psychology of Judging? 2-5 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't,
Harvard Univ., Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP07-049,
2008), available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP07049. While Schauer raises a valid concern, as others have pointed out, the onus
really should be on those that posit a unique psychology of judging. See Barbara A.
Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. PA.
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Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich have approached
judging from a behavioral law and economics perspective. They
have investigated the extent to which judges are subject to
cognitive biases 0 and have developed their findings into a
general psychological theory of judicial decisionmaking. 1"
In
another line of research, Dan Simon has developed his own
12
cognitive theory of judicial decisionmaking.
Another school of thought on judicial behavior has made
recent inroads into legal scholarship.
For over fifty years,
political scientists studying courts have endeavored to uncover
the determinants of judicial decisions empirically. Commonly
known as "judicial politics,"1 3 this body of research has
hypothesized that a judge's "ideology" is a significant
determinant of that judge's decisions,1 4 and judicial politics
scholarship claims to have found substantial evidence supporting
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 2 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/032007/Spellman.pdf. As legal scholars have long recognized, judges are human. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 7 (2008) ("My analysis and the studies
on which it builds find that judges are not moral or intellectual giants (alas),
prophets, oracles, mouthpieces, or calculating machines. They are all-too-human
workers, responding as other workers do to the conditions of the labor market in
which they work."); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (2007)
[hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking]; Gregory C. Sisk, Judges Are Human, Too, 83
JUDICATURE 178, 178 (2000) [hereinafter Sisk, Judges Are Human]; see also Chad
M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: InterdisciplinaryResearch and the Problems of
Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 128 n.11 (2007) (collecting articles
where authors note that judges are human). As humans, general theories of
psychology should apply equally to judges as to anyone else.
10 See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al.,
Judicial Mind]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006); Andrew J. Wistrich,
Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?
The Difficulty of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
" See Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 9. This work is discussed further in
Part II.C.
12 See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence
in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004); Dan Simon, Freedom and
Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 1097 (2002); Simon, PsychologicalModel, supra note 8.
," The body of empirical literature on judicial decisionmaking is still referred to
by a variety of names, including "judicial politics," "empirical judicial
decisionmaking," "judicial behavior," and "courts and judicial decisionmaking." For
the sake of clarity, this Article will only use the term "judicial politics" when
describing this field of research.
14 Judicial politics' theories of judicial decisionmaking are discussed in greater
depth infra Part I.A.
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this hypothesis. Judicial politics thus presents another possible
explanation for judicial behavior: Judges decide the outcome of a
case in a way that accords with their "ideology." In the past
decade, judicial politics has gained increasing attention in legal
scholarship.1" And while a few legal scholars outside of judicial
15 For examples of recent empirical studies on judicial decisionmaking published

in general submissions legal journals, see James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni &
Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999); Adam B.
Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 1457 (2003) [hereinafter Cross, Decisionmaking 2003]; Frank B. Cross &
Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of JudicialActivism, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1752 (2007); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001); Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Jason
J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical
Investigationof Legal Interpretation,65 MD. L. REV. 841 (2006); Lee Epstein, Daniel
E. Ho, Gary King & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War
Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight &
Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of PriorJudicialExperience and Its Consequences for
CareerDiversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003); Lee Epstein,
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among
Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483
(2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory
of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998)
[hereinafter George, Positive Theory]; Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and
Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999);
David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681 (2007); Timothy R. Johnson, James F.
Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme
Court: Does It Affect the Justices' Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457 (2007); David
S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication,and Asylum Law in
the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B.
Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of
Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (2006) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Regulatory Policy]; Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of ArbitrarinessReview, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review]; Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999); Richard L.
Revesz, CongressionalInfluence on JudicialBehavior?An Empirical Examinationof
Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001)
[hereinafter Revesz, Congressional Influence]; Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) [hereinafter
Revesz, Environmental Regulation]; Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
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politics have suggested that it should inform a variety of areas of
legal thought,'6 judicial politics, as a field of study, has been

COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004); Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who
Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473 (2002); Gregory C.
Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998);
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
612 (2004); Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological
Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797 (2006);
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004)
[hereinafter Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting]; Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female
Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005); Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Note, Gendered Justice: Do
Male and Female Judges Rule Differently on Questions of Gay Rights?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 2087 (2005); Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals
Revisited: The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689 (2004). For examples of
commentary on the empirical study of judicial decisionmaking in general submission
legal journals, see Frank B. Cross, PoliticalScience and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251 (1997)
[hereinafter Cross, New Legal Realism]; Harry T. Edwards, Collegialityand Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998) [hereinafter Edwards,
Collegiality]; Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 819 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383
(2007) [hereinafter Kim, Lower Court Discretion]; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008); Eric A. Posner,
Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies
for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853 (2008) [hereinafter
Posner, Political Bias]; Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance:An
Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005); Richard L. Revesz, Ideology,
Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit:A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA.
L. REV. 805 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public
and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 743 (2005);
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024747; Emerson H.
Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1999) [hereinafter Tiller & Cross, Modest Proposal]; Emerson
H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517 (2006)
[hereinafter Tiller & Cross, Legal Doctrine]; Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller
and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment
and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 873 (2008) [hereinafter Sisk, Quantitative Moment] (reviewing
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)).
16 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox Is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism
Meets Federalism, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 497, 500 (2007) (noting that
the work of judicial politics scholars "makes a very valuable contribution to our
understanding of how the Supreme Court actually functions," and suggesting that
legal scholars "ought to pay more (which is to say, at least, some) attention to [it]");
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embraced by a few,' 7 regarded as unremarkable or obvious by
some, 8 and rejected by others.
I suspect that this reception is due, at least in part, to the
unclear import of judicial politics scholarship. That is, judicial
politics scholarship has been woefully inadequate in defining
what precisely it means by "ideology." In some senses, then, it is
quite difficult to disagree with the conclusions of judicial politics
scholarship. Because judicial politics scholarship rarely defines
what exactly it means by ideology, its conclusions of ideological
decisionmaking can have very little content. Most legal scholars
could agree that judging is in some way "ideological," so long as
they could provide their own definition for "ideology." And
despite judicial politics scholars sometimes claiming otherwise,19
mainstream legal thought has more or less rejected the formalist
conception of judging that judicial politics sets out to refute.20
Indeed, while some judicial politics scholars claim to be the
modern vanguard of legal realism,2 ' the general views of legal
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006)
[hereinafter Friedman, Taking Law Seriously]; Oldfather, supra note 9, at 126
(suggesting that judicial politics studies might be used "to improve judicial
institutions"); see also Posner, Political Bias, supra note 15, at 853 (noting "the
increasing significance of the empirical study of judges and judicial decisions").
i7

See supra notes 15-16.

See, e.g., Wald, supra note 15, at 236 (noting her "ho-hum reaction to the
notion that judges' personal philosophies enter into their decisionmaking when
statute or precedent does not point their discretion in one direction or constrain it in
another").
'9 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64 (1993) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL
MODEL] (alleging that "many legal scholars" believe that judicial decisions can be
explained solely in reference to traditional legal materials such as case law and
statutes).
2o See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 131 (1997) (noting that "[tihe
mainstream legal view is antiformalist"). While this formalist conception of law has
become somewhat of an anachronism, much of the early judicial decisionmaking
research presented it as the only possible alternative to wholly political and
attitudinal decisionmaking. See Kim, Lower Court Discretion,supra note 15, at 39496. Still, the idea of determinate law seems to retain some allure in modern
jurisprudence. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY
SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
(2002) (criticizing foundational grand theories of constitutional law that posit single,
correct answers to constitutional issues).
21 See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L.
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE
DECISION MAKING 31 (2006) [hereinafter HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT]
("The attitudinal model of judicial decision making traces its roots to legal realism.");
18
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realists have become conventional wisdom in the legal academy.22
Thus, most legal scholars are unlikely to balk at the idea that
judging is "ideological"; the real question, though, is what
"ideological" actually means.
As I demonstrate below, a bit of reading between the lines
reveals that the majority of judicial politics scholarship conceives
of ideology as predominantly partisan politics. That is, an
"ideological" decision is one that promotes the agenda or platform
of one of the major political parties in the United States. Thus, a
judge makes a "liberal" decision when her vote corresponds to the
general (or stereotypical) position taken by the Democratic Party
on the particular issue, and vice versa for "conservative"
decisions and the Republican Party. And while some judicial
politics scholars have espoused agnosticism as to the cognitive
process by which party politics leads to judicial votes (that is,
why there is a relation between party politics and judicial votes),
as I demonstrate below, much of the scholarship presents an
image of judges as consciously and actively promoting a political
agenda. Thus, according to judicial politics, judicial behavior
boils down to a conscious and purposeful choice of an outcome
that relates to the position of the judge's political party.23
This conception of ideology and ideological judicial
decisionmaking is simplistic and misunderstands human
behavior. It conceives of ideology predominantly in political or
SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 19, at 65 ("The attitudinal model

has its genesis in the legal realist movement of the 1920s."). The attitudinal model
these scholars speak of is the basic model of judicial decisionmaking in much of
judicial politics scholarship and is discussed infra Part I.A.
22 See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467
(1988) (arguing that "[1]egal realism has fundamentally altered our conceptions of
legal reasoning and of the relationship between law and society," and that "[all
major current schools of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism").
As Singer noted, "[t]o some extent, we are all realists now." Id. Mark Tushnet has
recently argued that the same holds for critical legal studies. See Mark Tushnet,
Survey Article: CriticalLegal Theory (Without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J.
POL. PHIL. 99, 100 (2005) (arguing that "elements of the original critical legal studies
position.., have become conventional wisdom in the U.S. legal academy.").
23 Granted, this is a somewhat broad reading ofjudicial politics scholarship, and
in any summary of any minimally diverse field, some simplification is necessary
when describing general theories. Further, there is indeed some judicial politics
scholarship that takes a more nuanced view of judging or that incorporates how
other factors besides party politics might influence a judge's decision. These
approaches are discussed in greater depth infra Part I.A. However, I contend that
my reading of judicial politics scholarship is quite plausible, as my analysis of the
language judicial politics scholars often employ reveals. See infra Part II.
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partisan terms, as if the preferences of the Republican and
Democratic Parties' positions were the main source of judicial
preferences. Further, bearing the influence of traditional notions
of individual rationality and autonomy, it portrays judges as
rational actors that can consciously impose their policy
preferences through their decisions. This portrayal reflects the
same conception of individual behavior that law and psychology
challenges.
However, even if one rejects judicial politics' conception of
ideology and its influence, one still must contend with the reams
of empirical research that judicial politics scholars have amassed.
As discussed below, judicial politics scholars can adhere to their
hypothesis of judging as ideological (and ideology as partisan
politics) because their tests of this hypothesis have consistently
provided evidence in support of it. If one is to reject judicial
politics scholarship, one must still account for why judicial
politics scholarship has found such a consistent relation between
the various methods of operationalizing a judge's ideology, such
as political party of the appointing president, and judicial votes.
This lack of clarity, coupled with scores of empirical studies
that one cannot easily dismiss, creates a number of issues for
legal scholars. First, judicial politics scholarship effectively
characterizes judicial decisionmaking as party politics. In so
doing, it misunderstands the human side of judging and perverts
our understanding of judicial behavior. Second, as noted above,
some legal scholars are calling for the incorporation of judicial
politics scholarship into legal theory.24 Much judicial politics
scholarship is unapologetically positive2 5 and, as Barry Friedman
has noted, lacks any "normative bite."26 Yet, before turning to
the normative implications of judicial politics scholarship, it is
important to clarify what exactly this scholarship means.
Finally, the language and conclusions of judicial politics
scholarship enflame the myth of "judicial activism,"2 7 and
sometimes suggest a possibility of a return to formalist judging
24 See supra note 16.
25

See, e g., Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 15, at 814

(noting that their study's emphasis was "empirical, not normative").
26

See Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, supra note 16, at 262. There have been

some notable exceptions to this lack of normativity as the study of judicial politics
has spread into legal scholarship. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.
27 See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE
OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2006).
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(or, as it is sometimes called, the "ideal" conception of judging").
As the debate over activism is often more rhetoric than
substance, 29 we must promote a deeper and more nuanced
understanding of our judges so that debate about judicial
performance is informed, and perhaps even productive.
In this Article, I look to the social psychological theory of
naive realism to understand the empirical findings of judicial
politics scholarship.
Naive realism begins with the social
psychological truism that all perception is subjective. We see the
world and perceive reality through the biased lens of our own
perception.
Our beliefs, our experiences, and the cognitive
processes of our brains influence our perceptions of the world.
Based on this subjective perception, we construct, or construe, a
reality, and then make judgments and decisions based on our
construal of reality. However, we often fail to recognize the
subjectivity of our own perception, instead believing that we are
privy to the objective realities of the outside world.
This disparity between how we think we see the world
(objectively) and how we really see the world (subjectively) is
problematic because we often fail to appreciate the subjectivity of
both our own and others' perceptions. Thus, when someone
reacts differently to an object than we did-or we think a
reasonable person should-we do not attribute this difference to
disparities in subjective perception. We instead attribute such
differences to the influence of various biases, which often leads to
misunderstanding, aggravated disagreement, and even conflict.
The subjectivity of perception indicates that what might
appear to be political or partisan or "ideological" decisionmaking
is instead the result of the inevitable influence of human decision
makers perceiving their world subjectively.
The judicial
disagreement that is so central to judicial politics scholarship
might, at least in part, be a product of differing perceptions of the
relevant facts and law of a case. Understood through the lens of
naive realism, judicial politics scholarship demonstrates the
human side of judicial decisionmaking. While this might be one
See Oldfather, supra note 9, at 125-26.
In one of the more extreme recent examples, a speaker at the "Remedies to
Judicial Tyranny" meeting argued for the impeachment of Justice Kennedy on the
grounds that he upheld "Marxist, Leninist, satanic principles drawn from foreign
law" in his opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Dana Milbank, And
the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3.
28
29
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way to understand "ideological" judging, I am hesitant to use
that term due to its definitional malleability and rhetorical
baggage. Instead of defining ideology in a way that encompasses
the influence of our beliefs, experiences, and cognition on how we
subjectively perceive the word, I merely suggest that judging is
"subjective. '3' Although the statement that judging is subjective
might at first seem obvious, the implications of subjective judging
for our understanding of judicial decisionmaking are not.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I provide a
brief overview of the empirical study of judicial decisionmaking.
I introduce judicial politics' general theory of the attitudinal
model and its hypothesis that ideology plays some role in judicial
decisionmaking. Further, I explain how judicial politics scholars
test hypotheses derived from this theory and how the findings of
these studies do lend support to judicial politics' general theory.
While one might quibble with judicial politics scholars'
explanations for their empirical findings, namely that judging is
ideological and ideology is party politics, one still must reckon
with judicial politics' empirical findings.
I end Part I by
demonstrating why these findings raise issues that legal scholars
must address.
In Part II, I tackle the lack of clarity in what judicial politics
scholars mean when they say that judging is ideological. While
early attitudinal accounts took a broad view of ideology and its
influence, more modern accounts have taken a political turn,
often conceiving of ideology in political and partisan terms. As
judicial politics scholarship is rarely clear on what it means by
"ideology," my exploration of the literature lends some definition
to the subject.
In Part III, I introduce the theory of naive realism. First, I
demonstrate how individual subjectivity explains that two
individuals, including judges, can come to differing yet equally
sincerely held beliefs. Second, I show how this subjectivity can
result in perceptions of bias and, eventually, conflict. Third, I
show when and why we can expect such conflict to occur in our
courts.
In this way, naive realism indicates one way to
understand the sometimes bitter disagreement on appellate
courts.

30 Like ideology, subjectivity can encompass a variety of meanings, and I go into

greater depth on what I mean by subjective decisionmaking in Part III.
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In looking at the findings of judicial politics scholarship
through the lens of naive realism, I hope to address the issues
that the growth of judicial politics has created for legal scholars.
Namely, while legal scholars might reject the meager theory
underlying judicial politics, they must somehow account for
judicial politics scholars' substantial findings of statistical

relations between quantifiers for ideology and judicial votes. By
exploring the ways in which these findings might complement
other views of judicial decisionmaking, we are likely to come to a
more nuanced understanding of judicial behavior. Indeed, even
those that reject judicial politics out of hand might take
something from it.
This Article, however, is not confined to an internal debate
between two approaches to judicial behavior-one based in
psychology and one based in political science. In this Article, I
hope to show how the study of judicial behavior can inform legal
theory. I do this primarily by demonstrating why it is necessary
to address the lack of clarity in judicial politics scholarship in
Part I.B. But I also want to touch on how law and psychology
can inform legal theory. This is the focus of the Conclusion,
where I briefly discuss how naive realism complements and
informs various areas of legal theory.
I. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Before criticizing judicial politics scholarship, we must first
understand it. In this Part, I first briefly explain the general
theory and practice of judicial politics scholarship. Then, I argue
why it is so important to clarify what judicial politics scholars
mean by ideology.
A.

Understandingthe EmpiricalStudy of Judicial
Decisionmaking

While relatively new to legal scholarship, the empirical study
of judicial decisionmaking has its roots in the legal realist
movement of the early twentieth century. 31 According to the
popular account,32 the legal realists challenged the classical legal
ideal of formalism, or the idea that judges mechanically and
Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, supra note 16, at 263.
While scholars disagree over the exact contribution of the legal realists, this
issue is unnecessary to address or resolve for the purposes of this Article.
31
32
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dispassionately applied determinate law in deciding cases. 3 The
realists argued that traditional legal materials like statutes and
precedent were insufficient to determine the outcome of a case.
Instead, realists suggested that extralegal factors were, at least
in part, behind judicial decisions.3 4 While legal scholars soon
thereafter turned to the normative question of how judges should
decide cases, political scientists began investigating how judges
actually decided cases.3
What followed was the development of the empirical study of
judicial behavior in political science. 6
Having rejected
formalism, what judicial politics scholars now commonly refer to
as the "legal model" of judicial decisionmaking, political scientists
set out to determine what actually determined judges' votes.
Judicial politics scholarship quickly developed the theory that a
judge's "ideology" was the driving force of her decisions.
Eventually christened the "attitudinal model" of judicial
decisionmaking, this theory came to dominate the study of
judicial politics. Even as judicial politics scholarship matured
and began to look for other possible determinants of judicial
behavior, the influence of the attitudinal model has been
inescapable. And in the past decade, legal scholarship has been
paying increasing attention to the attitudinal model and judicial
politics scholarship in general.
The attitudinal model is judicial politics' major theoretical
answer to the question of how judges decide. In its most basic
form, the attitudinal model posits that judges decide cases based
33 Legal formalism is often summarized with Blackstone's phrase that judges
"are the depositaries of the law; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of
doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land."
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *69.
34 See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 113 (2000) ("Perhaps abstract legal
rules and principles did not constrain judicial decisions, realists asserted, but
concrete facts of the external (and social) world did not influence or even determine

such decisions. Furthermore ...

,

the relevant facts increasingly seemed to revolve

around the actions of individuals."); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 111 (Legal Classics Library 1985) (1930) ("The peculiar traits, disposition,
biases and habits of the particular judge will, then, often determine what he decides
to be the law.").
3' Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, supra note 16, at 263.
36 For histories of judicial decisionmaking literature, see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial
Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 1 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
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on their political attitudes and values. 7 As articulated by David
W. Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth in their 1976 study of Supreme
Court decisionmaking," the attitudinal model
assume[s] that the primary goals of Supreme Court justices in
the decision-making process are policy goals. Each member of
the Court has preferences concerning the policy questions faced
by the Court, and when the justices make decisions they want
the outcomes to approximate as nearly as possible those policy
preferences .39

More recent literature shortens the attitudinal model's basic
hypothesis to the prediction that "ideology" influences judicial
decisions.
To test the theory of the attitudinal model, judicial politics
scholars look to the attitudinal theory to build hypotheses,
empirical testing of which can potentially disprove the theory.
Thus, a common hypothesis that stems from the attitudinal
model is that a judge's ideology will relate to the ideological
content of her judicial votes. If judicial politics scholars can
somehow quantify ideology and the ideological content of judicial
votes, then they can test to see whether there is a significant
positive relation between the two.4 ° If there is no such relation,
then the data contradicts and potentially disproves the theory of
the attitudinal model.4

" Any theory employed by a variety of scholars across a large field of study is
likely to be subject to variations in conception. This generalization, however,
captures the major thrust of the attitudinal model as employed by most judicial
politics scholars.
38 Although this model was originally used to understand decisions in the
unique institutional environment of the Supreme Court, see SEGAL & SPAETH,
ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 19, at 69-72, later research has shown that it is of
comparable applicability to the United States Courts of Appeals, see HETTINGER ET
AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 32 ("[Slystematic evidence demonstrates
that the ideological or policy preferences of judges influence behavior on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals as well.").
39 DAVID W. ROHDE & HAXROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
72 (1976).
40 "Statistical significance" does not mean "significance" in the way the word is
commonly used. Instead, if a correlation is statistically significant, then it is unlikely
that the correlation is due to chance. See generally DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT
PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS 477-576 (4th ed., 2007).
41 One might initially allege that if there is a significant relation, the study has
still not "proved" the attitudinal model. Indeed, the data has only failed to disprove
the attitudinal model. But this is the standard approach of statistical analysis. Data
demonstrating a relation between judicial ideology and judicial votes does not fail to
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However, judicial politics scholars are rarely explicit in what
they mean by ideological decisionmaking. The mere statement
that a judge decides a case "ideologically" tells us very little of
what the attitudinal theory really means, as ideology can mean a
wealth of different things.
In this sense, judicial politics
scholarship seems, at least facially, quite undertheorized.
Further, depending on one's conception of what ideology entails,
the quantification of ideology into a form that can be subject to
empirical analysis might seem exceedingly difficult, or even
impossible. However, to understand judicial politics scholarship
better, we must for a moment put aside these problems of
definitional vacancy and quantifying ideology. For now, what is
important is that, if we assume that we can quantify ideologycertainly an arguable assumption-a relation between a judge's
ideology and the ideological content of her vote would lend
support to the theory of the attitudinal model.
Judicial politics scholars have found a wealth of evidence of
this relation. A number of studies have found that judges
appointed by Republican presidents, assumed to be more
conservative than their Democrat-appointed colleagues, vote
more conservatively than those appointed by Democratic
presidents. Judicial politics scholars have found such a relation
in a variety of controversial areas, including affirmative action,
Eleventh Amendment immunity, National Labor Relations Act
interpretation, sex discrimination, disability discrimination,
campaign finance regulations, and obscenity convictions.42 A
number of studies have found similar relations to votes in
environmental and other administrative law areas. 43 And these
results are not limited to traditionally controversial areas; other
studies have found similar relations in economic cases, such as
corporate taxation 4 and intellectual property.45

disprove the attitudinal model in the same way that a book falling to the floor does
not fail to disprove the theory of gravity.
42 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN &ANDRES SAWICKI,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 24-40
(2006) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?].
' See, e.g., id. at 25, 34; Miles & Sunstein, ArbitrarinessReview, supra note 15,
at 780-84; Miles & Sunstein, Regulatory Policy, supra note 15, at 827; Revesz,
EnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 15, at 1744; Tiller & Cross, Modest Proposal,
supra note 15, at 222-24.
4 See, e.g., Staudt et al., supra note 15, at 1817.
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More modern judicial politics scholarship has incorporated
the study of how other factors might affect judicial votes while
still looking for evidence of ideological influence. Perhaps most
predominantly, scholars have posited that judges recognize the
possibility of reversal by a higher court or legislature, and thus,
act strategically.4 6 Tests of this "strategic model" of judicial

decisionmaking, a variant of the attitudinal model,47 have found
evidence that strategic concerns play a role in how a judge
votes. 48 A number of studies have also found that judges
45 See, e.g., Matthew J. Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, The Effect of Judicial
Ideology in Intellectual Property Cases 39, 42 (Sept. 25, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997963.
46 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 24, 24 (2007) ("Positive political theories of judging suggest that much of the
policy discretion exercised by judges is guided by the judges' policy preferences,
constrained by the prospect of higher court review, and accomplished through a
variety of legal decision instruments available to judges when deciding cases.").
41 The strategic model has been gaining in popularity in the literature. See
Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Comparing
Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SC. 123, 124 (2004) [hereinafter Hettinger et al., Comparing
Accounts] ("In more recent years, however, the dominance of the attitudinal model
has been challenged by a portrayal of judges as strategic actors."). For an example of
the strategic model approach, see Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The
Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61
(2002). Yet strategic models still include a significant ideological element. See Cross,
Decisionmaking 2003, supra note 15, at 1461 ("[The strategic] model largely
accept [s] the premises of the [attitudinal] model but suggest[s] that
judges ... consider external responses to their decisions that would alter the
decisions' ideological effect."); Hettinger et al., Comparing Accounts, supra, at 123
("[Sitrategic accounts begin with the [attitudinal] assumption that judges are
motivated by their policy preferences."); Kim, Lower Court Discretion,supra note 15,
at 384-85 (noting that the strategic, or "positive political," model "shares the
attitudinalists' assumption that judges seek to advance their policy preferences;
however, it posits that in doing so, they act strategically, taking account of the likely
response of other actors and the institutional context in which they operate");
Revesz, Congressional Influence, supra note 15, at 1101 (stating that judges
engaging in strategic behavior "can ensure that the ultimate outcome, as opposed to
merely the judicial decision, is as close to their policy preferences as possible, given
the preferences of the institutions that have the power to reverse their decisions").
Under this model, judges act ideologically, but not blindly ideologically.
4'For other studies of the strategic model, see Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and
Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel
Effects 18-24 (Sept. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Kim, Deliberation and Strategy]
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115357; Law,
supra note 15; Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice
in the U.S. District Courts (Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114207; Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 46.
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evidence "panel effects"; while finding a relation between a
judge's ideology and her vote, these studies find that the ideology
of a judge's colleagues on an appellate panel seem to influence
that judge's vote.49
As studies uncover other factors that influence judicial
decisionmaking, judicial politics scholars are tending to find that
ideology plays a lesser-but still statistically significant-role
than was once thought.5 ° Still, even in studies that incorporate a
number of other possible influences on judicial decisionmaking,
ideology usually plays some role.51 As Gregory C. Sisk notes, "a
small effect does not necessarily mean an inconsequential effect.
That ideology plays any role in judicial decision making is an
important and substantive finding, even with the qualifying
understanding that the effect is constrained."5 2
The real trick of these studies, though, is quantifying the
variables in a manner that can be empirically tested. Judicial
votes might initially seem easy: We have records of how the
judge actually voted (e.g., affirm, reverse). Quantifying judicial
votes, however, is not that simple.
To test for ideological
relation-and note, we still have not defined what we mean by
ideology-we have to give some sort of ideological content to
judicial votes. This is often accomplished by coding votes for or
against certain parties in certain kinds of disputes as either
"conservative" or "liberal" according to the general (or
stereotypical) position of the Republican and Democratic Parties,
respectively, on the issue raised by the dispute. For example, a
41 For other studies of panel effects, see SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL?, supra note 42; Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin,

Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging (July 28, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001748; Cross & Tiller, supra
note 15; Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, InstitutionalDynamics on the U.S. Court
of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 299 (2004); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals over Time (May 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.comabstract=1012111; Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra
note 15; Miles & Sunstein, Regulatory Policy, supra note 15; Sunstein et al.,
Ideological Voting, supra note 15.
50 See Sisk, QuantitativeMoment, supra note 15, at 887.
51 See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 15, at 807
(noting that "judicial ideology is not playing a dominant role" in administrative
arbitrariness review, but still finding that "judicial policy preferences do play a
significant role, and in the difficult cases, it does [sic] seem to be driving actual
outcomes").
52 Sisk, QuantitativeMoment, supra note 15, at 890.
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vote in favor of an environmental group challenging
Environmental Protection Agency regulations would be regarded
as a liberal decision.
More difficult, though, is quantifying "ideology." Indeed, this
is perhaps the trickiest aspect of judicial politics research.53
Judicial politics scholars have developed a number of methods for
quantifying judicial ideology, often having something to do with
the major political parties in the United States. Judicial politics
scholars look to the political party of the judge herself, the
political party of the President that appointed her, or the political
party of other actors that might have influenced the appointment
of the judge (such as Senators in the case of senatorial courtesy).
Judicial politics scholars then consider a judge "conservative" or
"liberal" in light of these political indicators and tend to see this
as a reliable quantification of ideology. As Daniel R. Pinello
stated in his meta-analysis of studies that use the political party
affiliation, "[political] party is a dependable measure of ideology
in modern American courts." 4 Some studies have rejected the
binary Republican/Democrat quantification in favor of more
nuanced measures.5 5
These quantifications still do not explicitly annunciate what
judicial politics scholars mean by "ideology." Yet one possible
indicia of what is meant by ideology is the way in which judicial
politics scholars quantify this variable. These quantifiers of
ideology suggest a conception of ideology as partisan politics. If
ideology can be reasonably quantified by looking to the two major
political parties, then it is reasonable to conclude that what
judicial politics scholars mean by "ideology" is the popular

See

Posting

of

Greg

Sisk

to

Empirical

Legal

http://www.elsblog.org/the-empirical-legal-studi/2006/12/tricky-variable.html

Studies,

(Dec.

13, 2006, 19:23 CST).
54 Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999).
" These alternative measures include Martin-Quinn scores, see Andrew D.
Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005), Giles-Hettinger-Peppers scores, see
Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges:A
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001), and
Segal-Cover scores, see Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989). A full
discussion of the methods of quantifying ideology in these alternatives is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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division between the liberalism of the Democratic Party and the
conservatism of the Republican Party.56
Perhaps it is unfair, though, to look simply to how judicial
politics scholars quantify ideology in trying to determine what
they mean by it. Indeed, judicial politics scholars themselves
have noted
that the traditional political party measure is
"crude"57 and remind us that "partisanship and the political party
of the appointing president (for Article III judges) are best
approached as proxies for judicial attitudes, and not causes of
them."18 Further, judicial politics scholars sometimes explicitly
avow that they mean more than just party politics when they
talk about ideology.
Objections to reading too much into ideological quantifiers
alongside claims of broader ideas of ideology, though, do not
answer what judicial politics scholarship does mean when it talks
of ideology. This does not mean that we are left with no
indication, though. As I show below, the language employed
throughout much of the judicial politics literature reveals how
judicial politics conceives of ideology and its influence on judicial
decisionmaking. In short, the political and often pejorative
discussion of judging indicates that, when talking about ideology,
judicial politics scholars really do seem to mean little more than
partisan politics.
B.

The Importance of ClarifyingIdeology

Before investigating what judicial politics scholars mean by
"ideology," I must first address why clarification is so important.
Some judicial politics scholars have suggested that the meaning
of "ideology" and how it influences judicial decisionmaking are
irrelevant. There is some merit to this criticism; the studies
mentioned above (as well as the scores that were not discussed)
do indeed support the theory of the attitudinal model. That is, if
we put aside the problems of definition and quantification of
ideology, judicial politics scholars have provided significant
6 The more nuanced quantifiers that go beyond a binary Republican/Democrat
distinction do not escape these partisan politics implications. These measures still
place judges somewhere along a linear scale from "liberal" to "conservative." While
these measures recognize that there can be different kinds of Republicans and
different kinds of Democrats, they still quantify ideology in wholly partisan political
terms.
5' Heise, supra note 15, at 836.
5 Id. at 837.
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support for their theory in an empirically sound way. Frank B.
Cross once raised a similar objection, noting that
[n]either the label nor the internal aspects of decisionmaking
are central to the present question ....

Both the parties to an

individual case and the path of the law itself are affected by
ideological judicial outcomes, regardless of the label applied to
the process by which those outcomes were reached.59
Just as those working within judicial politics might see no need
to clarify their theory, legal scholars that reject judicial politics
would likely also see no need to delve deeper into the meanings of
ideology. These scholars might think that, due to the seeming
simplicity of judicial politics' conception of ideology, judicial
politics scholarship can merely be ignored.
I suggest that a deeper understanding of judicial politics is
internally necessary to judicial politics, as well as externally
necessary to the broader study of judicial behavior and legal
theory. First, while judicial politics is primarily positive, there
are some scholars both inside and outside of judicial politics
suggesting normative reforms of the legal system in light of
judicial politics findings. And, as mentioned above, some legal
scholars are calling for normative scholarship to pay increased
attention to judicial politics research."0 The lack of clarity in
judicial politics scholarship, though, raises problems for judicial
politics scholars suggesting normative reform as well as other
legal theorists looking to judicial politics to support normative
arguments. Without an understanding of what judicial politics
really tells us, there is potential for misunderstanding,
manipulation, and misapplication of empirical findings. Even if
one embraces judicial politics scholarship, it is necessary to
clarify what it means before convincing legal audiences of its
usefulness.
The problem that an incomplete understanding of ideology
presents for the normative application of judicial politics
scholarship is evidenced in the few judicial politics studies that
59 Cross, Decisionmaking 2003, supra note 15, at 1478. Cross later seemed to
reverse this position when he wrote, "Although the consciousness of the judicial bias
has not been determined, the existence or nonexistence of such consciousness may be
important. If we were to try to combat ideological judicial decision making, choosing

the best strategy might depend on whether the bias was conscious or subconscious."
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 15 (2007)

[hereinafter CROSS, DECISION MAKING 20071.
60 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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end with a suggestion of possible ways to reform the judiciary.
For example, those studying panel effects have argued for
increased judicial diversity,6 1 with some even suggesting that
every appellate panel include at least one Republican and one
Democratic appointee. 2 Such suggestions, however, are based on
an incomplete understanding of judicial behavior. That is, if
these reforms are meant to rein in "ideological" decisionmaking,
we should know what ideology means and how it influences
judicial decisionmaking before assessing the normative
desirability of these reforms.
Consider also the potential implications of judicial politics
scholarship for other areas of legal theory. If judicial politics
scholarship means to indicate that judging is an essentially
partisan activity, with judges promoting the agenda of one of the
major political parties, judicial politics scholarship might seem to
lend support to traditional concerns over the countermajoritarian
nature of the federal courts.6 4
Such an understanding (or
misunderstanding) of judicial politics scholarship might lead to
exaggerated concerns over judicial review. More to the point, if
we are to use judicial politics research in discussing and
potentially reforming the judiciary, we should have a deeper
understanding of what it is exactly that the research tells us.
Second, as to the broader study of judicial behavior, judicial
politics scholarship perpetuates a simplistic image of the judge
that distorts our perception of judging and the behavior of legal
actors in general. While judicial politics scholars deride formalist
jurisprudence for naively suggesting that judges could
mechanically apply determinate law to arrive at their decisions,
they present a similarly simple conception of judging. As I show
below, the portrayal of the judge in judicial politics scholarship is
that of a partisan, promoting the agenda or platform of one of the

See Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 15, at 347-52.
See Miles & Sunstein, ArbitrarinessReview, supra note 15, at 813; Tiller &
Cross, Modest Proposal,supra note 15, at 216.
' See Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 9, at 29 ("Given the central role that
judges play in the justice system both inside and outside the courtroom, reformers
must understand judicial decision making before they can reshape the justice system
to meet the needs of litigants and society.").
Barry Friedman has recently taken some steps towards the normative
implications of judicial politics scholarship for the institution of judicial review. See
Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of
JudicialReview, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1272-82 (2004).
61
62
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major political parties. Indeed, judges are often portrayed as
"politicians in robes." Underlying this portrayal is a view of
judges as rational actors, autonomously pursuing their policy
A deeper understanding of judicial politics
preferences.
demonstrates the antiquated conceptions of human behavior that
underlie much of the scholarship. As judicial politics scholarship
stands as a potential explanatory force within the study of
judicial behavior, we must understand what exactly it means
before critiquing it.
Third, while we might ultimately reject judicial politics'
theory of ideological judicial decisionmaking, it is difficult to
reject the masses of empirical evidence of the relation between
The
various quantifications of ideology and judicial votes.
attitudinal model and its conception of ideology easily explain
this relation: A judge's political party (or other quantifying
measure) consistently relates to her votes because judging is
However, if we reject the
essentially a partisan activity.
attitudinal model and its conception of ideology, how can we
make sense of the evidence that a judge's political party (or other
quantifying measure) consistently relates to her judicial votes?
II. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT IDEOLOGY
Despite the importance of clarifying ideology, much judicial
politics scholarship seems satisfied to leave it more or less loosely
defined. Even if we accept judicial politics' quantifiers of ideology
and acknowledge the masses of data that support the attitudinal
theory, it is still unclear what exactly this concept of ideology is."
This is not to say that judicial politics scholars have left us with
no indicia.
Consider Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise's
explanation of what judicial politics literature means by ideology:
When social scientists studying the lower federal courts or
politicians talking about judicial nominees to those courts refer
to "ideology," they usually mean nothing more than the issue
positions advocated by the Republican and Democratic political
65 Only a few others have noted this deficiency in the literature. See Edwards,
Collegiality, supra note 15, at 1347 (criticizing Richard L. Revesz for never defining
ideology in his study, Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 15); Dan M.
Kahan, "Ideology in" vs. "Cultural Cognition of" Law: What Difference Does It
Make? 2-3 (Mar. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (noting that judicial politics
scholars "have not been sufficiently clear about what they mean [when] they say
that a decision is 'ideological' "), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865.
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parties or the spectrum between conservatism and liberalism in
American political discourse (which in turn are associated to a
greater or lesser degree with those parties). In both the public
arena and the academy, ideology typically is plotted along a
single continuum from right to left (or vice-versa) and almost
invariably is associated with outcomes rather than the process
of decisionmaking ....
Moreover, ideology as used in these
contexts typically is evaluated in political terms as an extralegal influence on judging, not in terms of a judicial philosophy
that describes how a66judge appreciates and approaches legal
problems and sources.
Thus, under Sisk and Heise's conception of the attitudinal model,
judicial decisions are, at the very least, associated with the policy
positions of the major political parties.
Even though an
ideological federal judge might not be the same as a partyaffiliated legislator or other political actor, the difference is in
degree and not in kind.6 7 And Sisk and Heise's brief discussion of
ideology, relegated to a footnote, is the exception; rarely does
judicial politics scholarship pause to investigate what it means
by ideology. As I show below, it is the language of many modern
attitudinal accounts that portrays judges as political partisans.
Such partisan portrayal was not always the case. Some
early judicial politics research, in the spirit of popular accounts of
legal realism, set out to demonstrate empirically that factors
outside of traditional legal materials seemed to influence a
judge's decision. In this sense, ideology was merely shorthand
for all the possible extra-legal factors that might influence a
judge's decision.
However, the evolution of the attitudinal model has resulted
in a decidedly partisan portrayal of ideology, with partisan
motives dictating judicial votes. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth's 1993 explication of the attitudinal model, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model,6" exemplifies this portrayal.
Therein, Segal and Spaeth lent significant credence to the image
66 Sisk & Heise, supra note 15, at 770 n.156.
61 Compare CROSS, DECISION MAKING 2007, supra note 59, at 13 ("Judicial

ideology generally does not mean partisan politics. An ideological judicial activist
does not have his political party's interests at heart, according to the attitudinal
model. Instead, the judge has a personal ideology, on a two-dimensional liberal to
conservative scale, that drives his or her rulings."), with Tiller & Cross, Modest
Proposal, supra note 15, at 224 (noting the "evidence that partisan ideology often
influences judicial case decisions on a variety of issues" (emphasis added)).
68 SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 19.
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of partisan judging. While judicial politics scholarship soon
backed away from such a strict attitudinal account, Segal and
Spaeth's initial articulation of the attitudinal model still
influences more moderate attitudinal accounts.
In the sections that follow, I demonstrate how judicial
politics' conception of ideology has evolved into a conception of
judging as a partisan political activity. I show how the methods
and language of judicial politics scholarship evoke a simplistic
conception of ideology as partisan politics, where a judge's place
along a conservative-to-liberal dimension is a significant
determinant of her vote.
A.

Early Attitudinal Accounts
The partisan portrayal of judges was not always the norm in
judicial politics scholarship. In one of the first significant
empirical studies of what caused judges to decide cases in a
particular way, Glendon Schubert made the case that a judge's
attitudes determine the judge's decision.6 9 Basing his theory on
stimulus-response behaviorist psychology,7 ° Schubert posited
that a judge comes to her job with, or quickly acquires, wellstructured attitudes towards the issues that she commonly
faces. 7 ' When a case comes before the court, a judge's attitude
towards the particular issue (e.g., a motion to suppress evidence)
is activated. This attitude predisposes a judge to act a certain
way (e.g., denying the suppression motion).
In this way,
Schubert portrayed
extra-legal influences
as decidedly
subconscious. A judge does not choose to deny a suppression
motion due to her attitudes towards criminal defendants or the
suppression of evidence generally. Instead, the presence of the
particular issue psychologically triggers that response.
While referring to judges as "the political type," 72 Schubert
did not conceive of attitudes in solely political terms.
He

69

GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES

OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 10 (1965) [hereinafter SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL MIND].

Schubert defined attitudes as predispositions to respond to particular stimuli in
particular ways. Id. at 27.
70 See id. at 22-43, 286.
71 See id. at 37.
72 Id. at 12. Even this term, though, is not necessarily partisan. Schubert
defines the political type as "the man who displaces his private motives on public
objects, for which he then provides a rationalization in terms of public interest." Id.
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recognized that a variety of factors could influence a judge's
decision and viewed them as collectively constructing a judge's
attitudes.

In Schubert's words:

It seems likely that the health-both physical and mental-of
the justices has an influence upon their decisions; also their
ethnic origins, religion, political affiliation, indeed, their whole
life experience. But every one of these other sources of variance
can be conceptualized as an indirect influence upon a
respondent's attitudes toward policy values....

In focusing as I

have done upon attitudes and ideologies that are oriented
toward issues of public policy, these other influences have been
sublimated rather than lost ....

Thus, in Schubert's view, a judge's political affiliation was only
one of many sources of attitudes."
Just as a judge's attitudes were not dictated solely by
politics, Schubert did not see judicial decisions as dictated solely
by attitudes. Schubert made clear that he did not believe that
attitudes were everything, "either in life or on the Supreme
Court."7 6 While Schubert believed that attitudes were important
to judicial decisionmaking, so too were
social relationships and interaction, the quantity and quality of
information relied upon to define the decisional issues,
estimates of the probable implications of outcome alternatives,
beliefs about one's institutional role obligations, concern for the
cultural image that one will leave as his judicial trace, a host of
largely unexplored biological variables (ranging from temporary
and a variety of
but acute physical illness to senescence),
77
environmental and cultural variables.
David W. Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth built on Schubert's
theory and developed a slightly different conception of extra-legal

Schubert's definition of the political type does not include any substance of those
motives.
11 See id. at 287.
75

Id.
See id.

76

GLENDON

74

SCHUBERT,

THE

JUDICIAL

MIND

REVISITED:

PSYCHOMETRIC

ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY, at xiii (1974) [hereinafter SCHUBERT,
JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED]; see also SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 69, at

287 ("I do not for a moment delude myself in thinking that I have boxed the compass
of Supreme Court decision-making, by offering an interpretation exclusively in sociopsychological terms, and at that, one confined to judicial attitudes toward policy
values.").
71 SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED, supra note

76, at xiii.

2009] IDEOLOGY AND JUDICIAL POLITICS SCHOLARSHIP

257

influence. Rohde and Spaeth assumed that Justices on the
Supreme Court have "preferences concerning the policy questions
faced by the Court, and when the justices make decisions they
want the outcomes to approximate as nearly as possible those
policy preferences."78 Unlike Schubert, who saw attitudes as only
one influence on decisionmaking, Rohde and Spaeth argued that
the Justices had the freedom
to decide cases solely on their policy
preferences or attitudes. 79 While Rohde and Spaeth saw a larger
potential for the influence of attitudes, they also differed from
Schubert in that they gave no indication as to the source or
content of a Justice's attitudes.
Also looking to behaviorist psychology, Rohde and Spaeth
took a similarly agnostic view as to the operation of ideology.
According to Rohde and Spaeth, the presence of certain parties
and legal issues in a case activated a judge's attitudes towards
those parties and issues, resulting in predisposed treatment. 0
The judge could be conscious or unconscious of these attitudes.8 '
In either case, they amounted to a predisposed treatment that
did not necessarily imply a conception of partisan judges actively
imposing their policy preferences. Instead, judges merely had
attitudes that, like anyone else, predisposed them to respond to
certain stimuli in certain ways.
As these early attitudinal accounts demonstrate, the initial
empirical study of judicial behavior did not adopt a necessarily
political conception of judicial decisionmaking.
It instead
developed empirical evidence that the judge as an individual
played some role in the outcome of a case. Perhaps the findings
of early judicial politics scholarship can best be summed up in
the oft-repeated adage that judges are human.

78 ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note

39, at 72.
Id. at 72-74. Specifically, Rohde and Spaeth stated that policy preferences are
psychologically made up of beliefs, attitudes, and values. See id. at 74. But because
71

they defined attitudes as sets of beliefs, id. at 76, and values as sets of attitudes, id.
at 77, I refer solely to attitudes for clarity's sake.
8o See id. at 75 (adapting the model in Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Attitudes,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 449, 453 (1968)).
I" Rohde and Spaeth defined these attitudes as collections of beliefs, with beliefs
themselves defined as "any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious." Id. at 76
(quoting MILTON ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND VALUES 113 (1968) (emphasis

added)).
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B.

Modern Attitudinal Accounts and Their Implicit Image of the
Judiciary
More modern attitudinal accounts initially embraced the
notion of partisan judging.82
They conceived of ideology in
distinctly political terms and portrayed judges as imposing their
policy preferences through their decisions. Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth's two major accounts of the attitudinal model
exemplify this initial portrayal of partisan judging. 3 While
building on the work of Schubert, 4 Segal and Spaeth specifically
set out to explain judicial behavior by looking at the Supreme
Court Justices' "politicalattitudes and values. 8 5 As they put it,
"the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the
case vis-A-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.
Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is
extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because
he is extremely liberal."8 6 In making this argument, Segal and
Spaeth repeatedly point to the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore, 7 calling the decision "shamelessly partisan8 8 and
stating that the case should end the "pretense" of judges making
decisions on sincerely held legal notions. 9 And while Segal and
Spaeth claimed agnosticism as to whether judges consciously
implement their policy preferences through their decisions, 90 the
language used throughout their work at the very least hints at

2 See Tiller & Cross, Legal Doctrine, supra note 15, at 524 (noting that, after

Segal and Spaeth's

1993 work, some political scientists "concluded that case

outcomes were ... determined by judicial ideology" and that legal doctrine was
irrelevant).
83 SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 19, at 64, 65; JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED].

" See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 19, at xvi.
85 Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
86 Id.
at 65; see also SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra
note 83, at 312 (noting that "the attitudinal model holds that the justices base their
decisions on the merits on the facts of the case juxtaposed against their personal
policy preferences").
87 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
88 SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 83, at 2.
89

Id. at 431.

90 See id. at 433 ("The attitudinal position on motivated reasoning is one of

agnosticism. What matters is that the justices' ideology directly influences their

decisions.").
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some suspicion of conscious manipulation.9 1 Segal and Spaeth
Under their
thus portray judging as a partisan activity.
conception of the attitudinal model, judging is wholly political,
and decisions depend solely on the judge's ideology or personal
policy preferences. Essentially, legal doctrine is meaningless. 92
Along the lines of Segal and Spaeth, some argued that
ideology was the sole significant determinant of judicial
decisions. However, the inability for ideological quantifiers alone
to account for many judicial decisions led judicial politics
scholarship to be more measured in its claims of ideological
influence. As studies found that ideology alone could not explain
all case outcomes,9 3 judicial politics scholars set out to determine
what else did. Thus, as mentioned above, judicial politics
scholars have looked to the possible influences of a number of
other factors.9 4 However, even as judicial politics scholarship has
judicial
ideological
of purely
the
notion
abandoned
91 See, e.g., id. at 5 ("[T]he Court is free to construe any amendment-whether

or not it overturns one of its decisions-as it sees fit, even though its construction
deviates appreciably from the language or purpose of the amendment."); id. at 11-12
(hinting that Justice Scalia's "intelligence does not preclude self-deception" and
calling him "a judicial activist piously masquerading as a devoted adherent of the
words of the Constitution"); id. at 27 ("Aided and abetted by a mythology that blunts
criticism and insulates them from the hue and cry, judges blithely do their thing,
obligated to none but themselves."); id. at 41 (suggesting that federal jurisdiction
doctrine "enables the Court to adapt its policy making to the substantive personal
policy preferences of its members"); id. (giving Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), as an example of a case where "Justices who are conservative on criminal
procedure.., apparently thought the Court's traditional standard of review unduly
hindered them from reversing liberal state court decisions" and "changed the rules of
the game ... so that their substantively conservative policy preferences could
continue to be accommodated"); id. at 53 (arguing that traditional legal reasoning
"serve[s] only to rationalize the Court's decisions and to cloak the reality of the
Court's decision-making process").
Whether the justices [decide] with self-awareness or whether, consistent
with fundamental human psychological mechanisms, they are capable of
convincing themselves that Congress cannot block slavery in the territories,
that the due process clause implies a right to contract, that the Civil Rights
Act allows race to be a factor in hiring and promotions, that the Eleventh
Amendment applies to suits by a citizen of the state being sued, and thatas implausible as it might seem-the Florida recount violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, doesn't matter. The fact remains that the ideology
of the justices drives their decisions.
Id. at 433 (footnote call numbers omitted).
92 See generally HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999).
93 See Kastellec, supra note 49, at 19-20.
94 See supra Part I.
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decisionmaking, the influence of strict attitudinal theory
remains. Moreover, as judicial politics scholarship has expanded
into the study of lower courts,95 the strict attitudinal account has
continued to inform and influence the scholarship. For example,
much of the growing research on the courts of appeals has
adopted a political conception of ideological influence.
But it is not solely, or perhaps even mainly, in the findings of
ideological influence that modern judicial politics scholarship
portrays judges as partisans. Instead, much of this partisan
portrayal comes across in the language the scholarship uses.
One of the more stark examples of the partisan portrayal of
appellate judges is found in Frank B. Cross and Emerson H.
Tiller's study of the effects of panel composition on
decisionmaking. Criticizing what they characterize as legal
scholars' assumption of "the sincere application of legal doctrine
without considering the possibility that it may at times be
nothing more than a convenient rationalization for political
decisionmaking," Cross and Tiller explored how "judges disregard
96
legal doctrine in favor of partisan or ideological policymaking."
Cross and Tiller characterized judges as "decid[ing] cases
according to their political proclivities and us[ing] precedent, if at
all, as an ex post facto justification for their decisions";97 they
spoke of legal doctrine as "a constraint upon the pursuance of
policy goals,"98 and they looked for evidence of lower courts
"manipulating... doctrine to achieve politically desirable
outcomes. "99 Ultimately, Cross and Tiller praised ideologically
mixed panels where the minority panel member "can use doctrine
to corral the partisan ambitions of a court majority whose policy
95 In particular, judicial politics research on the federal appellate court level has
grown tremendously in the past decade. As many commentators have noted, for a
significant number of litigants, the Federal Courts of Appeals are the last stop in
litigation. See, e.g., George, Positive Theory, supra note 15, at 1635; Kim, Lower
Court Discretion, supra note 15, at 386 n.11. This has led a number of scholars to
recognize the courts of appeals' significant role in the judicial hierarchy and judicial
decisionmaking in general. See, e.g., CROSS, DECISION MAKING 2007, supra note 59,
at 2 ("The circuit courts play by far the greatest legal policymaking role in the
United States judicial system."); SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra
note 42, at 3 ("[TIhe courts of appeals play an exceedingly large role both in settling
disputes and determining the likely direction of the law.").
96 Cross & Tiller, supra note 15, at 2156.

91 Id. at 2156-57.
98 Id. at 2161.

1 Id. at 2162.
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preferences would best be accomplished by neglecting the
dictates of doctrine." 10 0
Cross and Tiller are by no means alone in this depiction of
judges. In one study, Donald R. Songer and his colleagues
investigated the effect of Supreme Court precedent on appellate
court decisions in search and seizure cases. 10 1 Songer et al.
characterized judges "as strategic political actors, [who] should
prefer that their own preferences control their circuit's decisions
rather than the Supreme Court's preferences."102 While finding
that precedent significantly influenced appellate court decisions,
Songer et al. still found that appellate judges frequently had
"room to maneuver" to pursue their own policy preferences. 0 3
Further, Songer et al. characterized this behavior as
"shirking."'0 4
In another study, McNollgast'0° began with the assumption
that judges "act rationally to bring policy as close as possible to
their own preferred outcome."0 6 McNollgast, though, admitted
some room for what they call "the standard idealistic textbook
model of judicial behavior, and do not ...deny in total the notion
that law school education and legal experience produce a 'judicial
temperament' that influences decisions by judges." 0 7
Still,
McNollgast ultimately "assume [d] that judges do not check their
political ideologies at the courthouse door ...and are willing to
make compromises between judicial and political norms and
their personal policy preferences. '"1"8
Frank B. Cross once suggested that one of the reasons for
incorporating attitudinal research into legal scholarship was so
"o Id. at 2175.
101 Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchyof
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court
Interactions,38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 673 (1994).
102 Id.
at 679. Songer et al. clarified this characterization with the assumption

that, "other things being equal, liberal judges will prefer liberal decisions emanating
from their court." Id.

1o'Id. at 692-93.
104 Id.
at 675, 693.
10' McNollgast is a pen name for the collaborative work of Matthew D.

McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast.
11 McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine
and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995). As McNollgast note, their
positive political theory approach is related to the attitudinal model in that both
assume that judges vote their preferences. Id. at 1636-37 n.10.
107

Id. at 1636.

108

Id. at 1636-37.
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that Congress could better "draft legislation in a manner that
will somehow constrain courts from disregarding the text and
intent of the law."" 9 Richard L. Revesz once posited that
particularly malleable procedural standards can "make [] it easier
for judges to indulge their ideological preferences." 1 0 Joseph L.
Smith and Emerson H. Tiller suggested that "[t]he political
models [of judicial decisionmaking] view judges as routinely
subordinating legal doctrine in order to pursue policy
outcomes.""' Max M. Schanzenbach and Tiller modeled judges
"as strategic policy makers who routinely manipulate doctrines,
procedures, and other decision 3instruments to advance their
1
2
preferred policies."" And so on. 1
Some of the more recent studies in judicial politics have
adopted a broader conception of ideology as more than simply
In his recent and exemplary study of
partisan politics.
decisionmaking on the United States Courts of Appeals, Frank B.
Cross endeavored to explain what judicial politics scholars mean
when they use the term ideology. As Cross saw it, ideological
judges do not engage in the usual political activities (e.g.,
14
bargaining, lobbying) of legislators and other politicians.
Instead, they "are sincerely voting their personal preferences,
conservative or liberal. 1 1 ' Again, the difference between judges
and other political actors seems to be one of degree. However,
Cross later defines ideological decisions as those influenced by
any number of extra-legal influences, including a judge's
Cross, New Legal Realism, supra note 15, at 324.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 15, at 1731. Revesz later
spoke of the strategically ideological judge, who considers the likelihood of reversal
and may moderate her ideological voting. See id. at 1767. Such a strategic account
seems to imply conscious ideological voting.
I" Smith & Tiller, supra note 47, at 62.
112 Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 46, at 24; see also Max M. Shanzenbach &
Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: JudicialPolitics, Empirical
Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 724-25 (2008).
113 1 do not mean to attribute such accusations of partisan judging to the
authors of the works discussed above. I suspect that part of this partisan portrayal
stems from the simplifications necessary when testing any model of human
behavior. Because the real causes of behavior are likely infinite, we must make
simplifying assumptions to begin to understand that behavior. And I suspect a
negligent choice of rhetoric is behind some of the more stark portrayals of partisan
judging. Yet even if these suspicions are correct, this does not address the problem of
the partisan portrayal of judging in judicial politics scholarship.
114 CROSS, DECISION MAKING 2007, supra note 59, at 13.
"11Id. Because of this distinction, Cross prefers the term "ideology" to "political."
19

110
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personal background and sense of justice.11 6 While Cross admits
that, under this conception, "ideological" decisions could just as
easily be called "just" decisions, he decided to characterize them
as ideological due to the relation to the ideology of appointing
presidents. 117 By retaining the term "ideological," however,
Cross's study is burdened by that term's partisan baggage.
Cass R. Sunstein and his colleagues adopted a similarly
broad conception of ideology in their recent studies. Sunstein et
al. did not doubt that, at least in cases where there is no binding
law, "the convictions of particular, flesh-and-blood judges-their
own views about how to handle difficult questions-inevitably
play a role" in judicial decisionmaking.118 They explicitly reject,
however, the view that their findings "support the simple and
unambivalent conclusion that federal judges are, in an important
sense, political or ideological."'1 9 They instead are much more
careful with their conclusions on ideology, finding "strong
evidence of ideological voting in the sense that Democratic
appointees are far more likely to vote in the stereotypically
liberal direction than are Republican appointees."12 °
They
ultimately conclude that, "[fior all of their differences,
Democratic and Republican judicial appointees are rarely
ideologues or extremists."1 21
By taking a broader conception of ideology and backing away
from the more partisan conception typified by Segal and Spaeth's
work, Sunstein et al. provide a hint of a return to the broader
conception of ideological influence that characterized the work of
Schubert; while Sunstein et al. titled their work the provocative
Are Judges Political?, their answer seems to be the much less
provocative "no." Still, Cross and Sunstein et al.'s explicitly
broader conceptions of ideology are much more the exception
than the norm. The continued use of the terms "political" and
"ideological," along with the continued influence of strict

116 Id. at 16.
117

Id.

supra note 42, at viii; see also id.
at 147 (noting that "[n]o reasonable person seriously doubts that ideology,
understood as moral and political commitments of various sorts, helps to explain
judicial votes").
118 SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?,

119 Id. at viii.
120 Id. at 19 (emphasis
121

Id. at 83.

added).
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attitudinalism, have maintained an image of the judiciary that is
ambiguously political at best and pejoratively partisan at worst.
C.

Alternative Explanations
This brief review of judicial politics scholarship provides
some insight into the concerns raised above. First, it appears as
though judicial politics scholarship conceives of ideology in
partisan, political terms. Thus, these scholars' senses of ideology
seem close to more popular (and pejorative) conceptions of
ideology. If one embraces this conception of ideology, then the
possible normative implications of judicial politics research are
many, especially among those concerned with politicized judicial
review. However, such an understanding of ideology can also
quite reasonably be rejected as simplistic.
Second, judicial politics scholarship seems to conceive of
judicial behavior as traditionally rationalist and autonomous.
Judges both know their partisan preferences and actively work to
promote them through their decisions. However, as discussed in
the Introduction, a large and ever-growing body of law and
psychology research is challenging this traditional conception of
human behavior. Thus, one might quite reasonably doubt that
judges are able to accomplish the behavior that judicial politics
scholarship ascribes to them.
Consequently, one might very reasonably reject the
theoretical conclusions of judicial politics scholarship. That
leaves us, though, with the third issue raised above: How do we
reckon with the empirical findings of judicial politics scholarship?
Granted, many judicial politics scholars' findings support the
hypothesis that judges decide cases ideologically. However, these
scholars' conceptions of judging as ideological and ideology as
party politics is not the only reasonable conclusion to draw from
their data. A significant relation between quantifiers of a judge's
ideology and her decision in a particular case does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that a judge is usurping the law and
enacting her own policy preferences.122
122 See Cross, New Legal Realism, supra note 15, at 283 ("The fact that judges
consistently decide cases in accordance with their political beliefs does not itself
prove that they are deciding cases because of their political beliefs." (emphasis
added)). But see id. ("The presence of a statistically significant correlation, however,
does provide us with potentially strong evidence of causation and can certainly cast
great doubt on the legal model.").
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A few scholars have offered alternative explanations for the
findings of judicial politics research. Scholars taking a somewhat
positivist approach note that discretionary determinations are
purposefully and unavoidably inherent in many areas of the
law. 123 In particular, Pauline T. Kim has argued that judges
necessarily run into discretionary issues where the law "runs
out,"1 24 and thus must make a decision based on some extra-legal
factor. In such cases, any number of forces might influence a
judge's decision. By focusing upon the existence of such nondeterminate legal issues, Kim offers one response to the portrait
of judges and judicial decisionmaking in much of the literature.
That is, because law itself is not always determinate, the
disagreement that is central to the study of judicial politics is
almost inevitable.125 Consequently, the legal system has built-in
areas where judges must exercise some discretion, and there is
nothing problematic if political views influence that exercise. 26
I suggest that we can better understand the empirical
evidence of the attitudinal model, at least in part, by taking a
123

As Orley Ashenfelter and his colleagues state:

A finding of statistical significance in ["close" or opinion-worthy cases]
suggests less than it first seems to show. In close cases, something must
make a difference. It could be random fluctuation, what the judge ate for
breakfast, the judge's background, or other less obvious factors. It is not
self-evidently disturbing when the judge's worldview (as revealed by party
affiliation and other variables) dominates over some competing sources of
decision.
Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 263 (1995).
124 Kim, Lower Court Discretion, supra note 15, at 410. As Kim writes, in some
cases, the
application of the relevant authority to the case at hand requires the
exercise of judgment, perhaps because the precise issue raised in the case is
not addressed by the rule, or because the rule itself calls for the exercise of
judgment, as in the case of a multifactor balancing test.
Id. at 409-10.
125 See id. at 434.
126See id. at 428-29 (arguing that judges coming to different conclusions on the
same issue can still be complying with the obligations of governing law where the
application of that law requires an exercise of discretion); see also Kim, Deliberation
and Strategy, supra note 48, at 19 ("In using [the terms ideology or policy
preferences],
I do not mean to suggest that judges disregard
the
law ... [nor ... that there is necessarily anything illegitimate about a judge's
pursuit of policy goals."). For other examples of alternative explanations to judicial
politics research, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics?
Harmonizingthe Internal and External Views of Supreme Court DecisionMaking, 30
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 89 (2005); Kahan, supra note 65.
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psychological approach to judicial behavior. I am not alone in
this assertion; Chris Guthrie and his colleagues recently
suggested
that their
psychological
model
of judicial
decisionmaking might account for the data found by judicial
politics scholars. Building on their prior research on judges'
susceptibility to cognitive biases, 12 Guthrie et al. offered a model
of judicial decisionmaking that they call the "intuitive-override"
model. 2 ' Focusing on the roles of intuition and deliberation in
decisionmaking, Guthrie et al. conceive of judges as normal
human beings that are subject to the same mechanisms of
judgment and decisionmaking as everyone else 129 and argue that
judges often reach judgments through intuition. 3 ' They then
suggest that judges should (and sometimes already do) check
these intuitive judgments through deliberation.'
Guthrie et al. hint that this model is a way of understanding
the findings of judicial politics literature, describing their model
as
a
middle
ground
between
formalist/legal
and
realist/attitudinal models of decisionmaking. 1 2 While Guthrie et
al. make a valuable contribution to the psychology of judicial
decisionmaking, their theory does not offer a satisfactory
explanation for the studies of ideological influence in the judicial
politics literature. We can place Guthrie et al.'s model within the
greater body of research by understanding intuitive judicial
decisionmaking as that most influenced by partisan politics,
while deliberative decisionmaking checks this influence and
moves decisions closer in line with the seeming dictates of the
law. Findings of seemingly ideological decisionmaking, then,
would be reflective of intuitive decisionmaking.
But this
explanation still does not tell us why intuitive judgment leads to
seemingly ideological results and does not even address the issue

127 See Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 9; Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind,
supra note 10; Rachlinski et al., supra note 10; Wistrich et al., supra note 10.
128 Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 9, at 3.
129 See id. at 9.
1"0

See id. at 31-33.

See id. at 33-43.
See id. at 3 ("[N]either the formalists nor the realists accurately describe the
way judges make decisions, but... key insights from each form the core of a more
accurate model."); see also id. ("Less idealistic than the formalist model and less
cynical than the realist model, our model is best described as 'realistic formalism.' ").
131
112
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of what ideology entails. 13 3 Consequently, the psychology of
judicial decisionmaking is ripe for study.
In a similar vein, I argue that the seemingly ideological
division in judicial decisions can stem from the subjectivity
inherent in the act of perception. 3
In short, we subjectively
perceive our world and make judgments and decisions based on
that subjective perception. Yet we also often fail to recognize
that others might perceive the same objects differently. These
different perceptions can then lead to different judgments. And
as discussed below, such differences in perception are likely in
areas of substantial social disagreement.
In terms of judicial politics research, findings of ideological
division might rest in part on differences in perception.
Particularly in discretionary or ambiguous areas, judges might
perceive the facts and law of a case differently. Consequently,
they may come to sincerely believe in the absolute correctness of
opposing outcomes. If these judges fail to recognize that their
disagreement is due to perception, then they are at risk of
misunderstanding, misattribution of bias, and perhaps even
conflict.
III. NAiVE LEGAL REALISM

This Part has two purposes. First, I introduce the theory of
naive realism. While social psychology has become increasingly
popular in legal circles over the past decade, legal scholarship
has almost entirely ignored the insights of naive realism. 5 This
is surprising, however, as it is by no means a fringe theory and
has great potential for informing a variety of legal debates. By
summarizing the theory as well as some of its empirical evidence,
I hope to provide a jumping-off point for other scholars to

133

This is not a criticism of Guthrie et al., however, as it was not a question

they set out to answer. Instead, I simply want to demonstrate that, even in the
literature that looks more closely at the psychological processes of decisionmaking,
the question of ideological influence has thus far gone relatively unaddressed.
134 Dan Kahan has recently suggested a similar psychological way to account for
the findings ofjudicial politics. See Kahan, supra note 65.
135 The two notable exceptions are Lee Ross and Donna Shestowsky's brief
summary of naive realism, see Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary
Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081 (2003),
and Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson's very recent and more thorough review of the
theory, see Benforado & Hanson, Natve Cynicism, supra note 4.
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investigate how naive realism can illuminate issues in other
areas of the law.
Second, I demonstrate how naive realism can inform the way
we think about judicial decisionmaking. Naive realism provides
one way we can understand the findings of judicial politics
scholarship. Moreover, while I focus on judicial politics research,
I also suggest how naive realism has the potential to inform
broader discussions of judicial decisionmaking.3 6
A.

Perceptionsof Bias and Naive Realism

Perceptions of bias are common in modern social discourse.
We often notice that people's positions on various issues seem to
conveniently coincide with their self-interest, monetary or
otherwise.
We suspect that people's experiences or
characteristics (e.g., race, gender, religion, or political party)
influence their opinions.
And as the insights of cognitive
psychology become more common in popular culture, 137 we spot
the effects of cognitive biases in the judgments and decisions of
others.
More formally, psychologists have identified and studied a
wealth of motivational and cognitive biases that affect judgment
and decisionmaking. 138 In the past decade, the insights of this
139
social psychological research have stormed legal scholarship.
As familiarity with this research grows, the tendency to spot bias
in legal contexts has also grown. But even before we had labels
like "availability,"'14 "hindsight bias,"'
and "overconfidence
136 While a full discussion is well beyond the scope of this article, I also briefly
explore the ways that naive realism can extend beyond judicial politics literature in
the Conclusion.
137 A number of popular social science ("PopSocSci")
books have included
insights from social psychology research. See, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON
HAPPINESS (2007); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY
ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW (Abacus 2007) (2004).

138 See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 56-67 (4th ed. 2008)

(cataloguing biases); see also supra note 2.
,' See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 2, at 163.
141

UNDER

UNCERTAINTY:

See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past:

Heuristics and Biases in

Hindsight, in

JUDGMENT

UNDER

UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 2, at 335; Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived
Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &

PERFORMANCE 349 (1977); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ; Foresight: The Effect of
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bias,"142 we have long perceived seeming instances of irrational

and biased behavior in others.
Such bias spotting is particularly common when we evaluate
the judgments and decisions of those that disagree with us.
People on the opposing side of an issue are thought to be selfishly
motivated to defend their side because their position gives them
benefits, tangible or intangible. We see them as blinded by the
biasing influence of experiences that hinder their ability to
evaluate an issue rationally. In addition, we regard them as
subject to cognitive biases that systematically skew rational
thought.
While such perceptions of bias are not necessarily in error
(and, indeed, might to some extent be accurate), we often fail to
perceive the possibility that the same biases might be influencing
our own judgment. We instead see our own judgment as based
on a neutral, dispassionate evaluation of the situation. While we
notice that an opposing partisan's position suspiciously aligns
with her own self-interest, we often fail to notice that our own
positions similarly align with our own self-interests. While we
may suspect that someone's experiences inhibit their ability to
evaluate a situation rationally and objectively, we perceive any
influence from our own experiences as a source of enlightenment.
Moreover, while we might spot the influence of cognitive biases
in the judgments of others, introspection into our own judgments
often fails to find any hint of the same cognitive biases.
Consequently, we tend to manifest a significant disparity in
the perception of bias in others versus the self. And this
disparity is hugely important both inside and outside the law.
When we perceive those with whom we disagree as infected by
bias, we often exaggerate our disagreement. Not only does this
disparity in perceptions of bias hinder communication, but it also
can lead to misattribution, misunderstanding, and ultimately,
conflict.
The social psychological theory of naive realism has
illuminated the cause of such perceived disparities of bias."'
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).

See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is
Above Average: Perceptionsand Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17
LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 439 (1993); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981).
142
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Naive realism begins with one of the "truisms" of modern social
psychology 144: Individuals perceive and construe the world
subjectively. 145 Social psychology has demonstrated "the fact,
and perhaps more importantly the insight, that people are
governed not by the passive reception and recognition of some
invariant objective reality, but by their own subjective
representations and constructions of the events that unfold
around them." 46 In perceiving the world, "we take physical
stimuli and each create, or construe, a subjective reality which
mirrors some external
situation through the filter of our own
1 47
minds and senses."

143 Foundational pieces on naive realism on which this Part significantly relies

include LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991); Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross,
Subjective Construal,Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding,24 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 319 (1991); Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich & Lee
Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self
Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781 (2004) [hereinafter Pronin et al., Eye of the
Beholder]; Emily Pronin, Carolyn
Puccio & Lee Ross, Understanding
Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 2, at 636 [hereinafter Pronin
et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding];Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism
in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding,in VALUES
AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel & Terrance Brown eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Ross & Ward, Naive Realism]; Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological
Barriers to Dispute Resolution, 27 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 255
(1995) [hereinafter Ross & Ward, Psychological Barriers].
144 See Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 135, at 1088; see also Griffin & Ross,
supra note 143, at 334 ("[Tjhe study of situational construal-that is, the study of
individual, group, and societal constructions of social meaning-lies at the heart of
both classic and contemporary social psychology."); Robert J. Robinson, Dacher
Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal:
"Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995) ("The recognition that human beings actively construe and
even construct the phenomena they encounter, and the further recognition that the
impact of any objective stimulus depends on the subjective meaning attached to it by
the actor, have long been among psychology's most important intellectual
contributions."); Ross & Ward, Naive Realism, supra note 143, at 103. This truism
has not been ignored by the judiciary. See Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast
and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS
FROM THE BENCH 76, 80 (David M. O'Brien ed., CQ Press 2008) (1997) ("We all view
reality from our own peculiar perspective.").
"" For a history of the study of subjectivity in social psychology, see Griffin &
Ross, supra note 143, at 320-25.
146Id. at 320.
147 Robert J. Robinson & Raymond A. Friedman, Mistrust and Misconstrual in
Union-ManagementRelationships: CausalAccounts in Adversarial Contexts, 6 INT'L
J. CONFLICT MGMT. 312, 312 (1995).

20091 IDEOLOGYAND JUDICIAL POLITICS SCHOLARSHIP

271

At first, the statement that we perceive the world
subjectively might seem unremarkable, obvious, or even
tautological, but the implications of subjectivity are not. While
we perceive the world subjectively, we also systematically fail to
appreciate the subjectivity of our own perception. Instead, we
often believe that our understanding of reality is based on
objective observation.
We think we have tapped into an
untainted perception of reality and then make rational
judgments and decisions based on this seemingly objective
reality. We often manifest an illusion of personal objectivity and
believe that we see the world "as it is."1 48 This illusion of
objectivity "is inescapable and deep, and it governs our day-today functioning despite what we may know about the
constructive nature of perception." 4 ' Further, this illusion is not
limited to perceptions of the physical world or trivial matters;
indeed,
naive realism makes its influence felt not only in convictions
about physical reality but also in convictions about complex
social events and political issues. We cannot fully escape the
conviction that we likewise perceive such events and issues as
they "really are," and that other reasonable people who have the
same information about those events
and issues will, or at least
150
should, perceive them similarly.
At the same time, we believe that others are making their
own judgments based on the same objective reality. As long as
they are as rational as we are, we think that they should come to
the same judgment of the object or stimulus as we did. If they do
not, then we must somehow account for these differences in
judgment. It is this accounting for difference that often leads to
misattributions of bias.

14'Pronin et al., Eye of the Beholder, supra note
149

143, at 781.

Id. at 783.

The failure of perspective taking, or more specifically, the failure to treat
the other person's 'surprising' and seemingly 'unwarranted' response as a
cue that the person is responding to a different situation than the one we
assume (or at least a different subjective construal of that situation) is a
ubiquitous feature of social and political life.
Ross & Ward, Psychological Barriers,supra note 143, at 278.
150 Pronin et al., Eye of the Beholder, supra note 143, at 783.
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This situation is best summarized in three first-person
tenets:
1. I see stimuli, issues, and events as they are in objective
reality, and my social attitudes, beliefs, preferences, priorities,
and the like follow from a relatively dispassionate (indeed,
unmediated) apprehension of the information or evidence at
hand.
2. Other rational social perceivers generally share my
judgments and reactions-provided that they have had access to
the same information that gave rise to my views, and provided
that they too have processed that information in a reasonably
thoughtful and open-minded fashion.
3. The failure of a given individual or group to share my
judgments and reactions arises from one of three possible
sources: (1) the individual or group in question may have been
exposed to a different sample of information than I was (in
which case, provided that the other party is reasonable and
open-minded, the sharing or pooling of information will lead us
to reach agreement); (2) the individual or group in question may
be lazy, irrational, or otherwise unable or unwilling to proceed
in a normative fashion from objective evidence to reasonable
conclusions; and (3) the individual or group in question may be
biased (either in interpreting the evidence or in proceeding from
evidence to conclusions)
by ideology, self-interest, or some other
15
distorting influence. 1
In short, we believe our judgments to be based on a rational
evaluation of reality. Because we see our judgment as the most
rational one in light of reality (if we realized that it was not, we
would likely change our judgment to that which was most
rational), we expect other rational people to share our judgments.
When another person disagrees with us, however, we must
somehow account for our differing judgments. It is in this
reconciliation of disparate judgment that we attribute bias to
others.
This attribution is errant in two respects. First, while we
might be somewhat accurate in our attributions of bias to the
judgments of others, we fail to perceive the same bias in our own
judgments. What we believe is a judgment based on objective
reality is instead a judgment based on how we have subjectively
perceived and construed reality. Second, just as we subjectively
perceive and construe the world, so does everyone else. If two
...Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note 143, at 647.
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rational and dispassionate observers differ in their subjective
perception of the same object, they can quite reasonably come to
two divergent judgments about that object.
Further, each
observer can sincerely believe that her own judgment is the only
reasonable one based on an objective evaluation of the object.
Yet, it is not the judgment of the object on which they are
152
disagreeing, but the very object that they are judging.
Consequently, our illusion of personal objectivity, our naive
belief that we see the world as it really is, can lurk behind much
of the conflict in our lives. This is the insight of naive realism.
The works of Lee Ross, Emily Pronin, and others have provided a
wealth of insight into when such differences in subjective
perception lead to misattributions of bias. Further, they have
offered ways to possibly mitigate disparities in perceived bias
and have hinted at a better way to approach some of our most
contentious social issues.
In the sections that follow, I review the evidence of naive
realism in both individual and collective decisionmaking.
Applying the insights of naive realism to judicial decisionmaking,
I offer one alternative way to understand the findings of judicial
politics literature.
B.

Individual Subjectivity and IndividualDecisionmaking

1.

Subjective Perception and Perceptions of Objectivity
As noted above, we often perceive the world subjectively
while maintaining a belief in our own objectivity. In the sections
that follow, I review some of the empirical evidence of these
aspects of naive realism. First, I illustrate the subjectivity of our
own perception through the phenomenon of biased assimilation.
Then, I provide evidence of the tendency for individuals to see
themselves and their judgments as objective. Finally, I show
how we often fail to notice bias in our own judgments.

152

See SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 424 (1952) ("[T]here has been no

change of evaluation, but rather a change in that which is being evaluated. The
fundamental fact involves a change in the object of judgment, rather than in the
judgment of the object." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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a.

Biased Assimilation

In one classic study, Princeton and Dartmouth football fans
demonstrated the subjectivity of perception and construal.
Albert H. Hastorf and Hadley Cantril showed a film of a
particularly brutal football game between Princeton and
Dartmouth to students at those schools. 53
The Princeton
students observed the Dartmouth team committing twice the
number of fouls that the Dartmouth students saw.1 4 Princeton
students also saw two flagrant fouls by the Dartmouth team for
every mild foul, 1 5 while the Dartmouth students saw an equal
number of flagrant and mild fouls by their team. 5 6 These
perceptions mirrored the disparate accounts of the game offered
by Princeton and Dartmouth newspapers;5 7 the disparity in the
media was so pronounced that one Dartmouth fan, upon
receiving a copy of the film, thought his copy was incomplete and
requested the missing part that contained all the infractions by
158
the Dartmouth players that he had read about.
While the Hastorf and Cantril study may at first seem to be
a simple example of overactive fandom, further reflection reveals
the disparity in subjective understanding of the game. As
Hastorf and Cantril explained, "the 'game' actually was many
different games and... each version of the events that
...See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 129, 129-130 (1954).
154 Id. at 130.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 132.

The Daily Princetonianreads:
This observer has never seen quite such a disgusting exhibition of so-called
"sport." Both teams were guilty but the blame must be laid primarily on
Dartmouth's doorstep. Princeton, obviously the better team, had no reason
to rough up Dartmouth. Looking at the situation rationally, we don't see
why the Indians should make a deliberate attempt to cripple [Princeton's
star player] Dick Kazmaier or any other Princeton player. The Dartmouth
psychology, however, is not rational itself.

'5

Id.

at

129 (quoting DAILY PRINCETONIAN,

Nov. 27,

1951). In

contrast,

the

Dartmouth, Dartmouth's student newspaper, indicated that the injuries to
Princeton's star player" 'were no more serious than is experienced almost any day in
any football practice.' " Id. at 130 (quoting DARTMOUTH, Nov. 28, 1951). Further, the
paper indicated that the Princeton coach encouraged his players to injure
Dartmouth players and that while both teams were penalized, "'most of the
roughing penalties were called against Princeton while Dartmouth received more of
the illegal-use-of-the-hands variety.'" Id. at 129-30 (quoting DARTMOUTH, Nov. 27,
1951).
" Id. at 132.
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transpired was just as 'real' to a particular person as other
versions were to other people."' 59 The seemingly singular event
resulted in just as many different experiences as there were
observers. 160 Indeed, it is misleading to speak of the singular
event, as "there is no such 'thing' as a 'game' existing 'out there'
in its own right which people merely 'observe.' "161 Instead, "the
'thing' simply is not the same for different people whether the
'thing' is a football game, a presidential candidate, Communism,
or spinach." 6 2
This differing perception is a manifestation of biased
assimilation. Biased assimilation is the tendency for people to
interpret new information in a manner that reinforces prior
beliefs. 163 Information that supports a previously held belief is
accepted relatively less critically while information that is
inconsistent with a previously held belief is met with scrutiny
and doubt.'6 4 In the Hastorf and Cantril study, fans of each team
likely held beliefs in the sportsmanship of their own players and
its absence in opposing players. These fans were then quicker to
see infractions by the opposing side than by their own.
In another classic study of biased assimilation, Charles G.
Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper found that opponents and
proponents of the death penalty differently construed the same
body of evidence depending on whether it supported or
contradicted their previously held beliefs. 165 All subjects were
shown the same two studies on the deterrent effect of the death
penalty, one arguing that it was an effective deterrent and the
other arguing the opposite. 166 Even though they were viewing

159

Id.

160 See id.
161

Id. at 133.

162

Id.

163

See THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF

HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 50 (1991).
164 See id. ("When examining evidence relevant to a given belief, people are
inclined to see what they expect to see, and conclude what they expect to conclude.
Information that is consistent with our pre-existing beliefs is often accepted at face
value, whereas evidence that contradicts them is critically scrutinized and

discounted.").
161 See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2105-06 (1979).
" See id. at 2100.
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identical information, both sides believed that the evidence lent
more support to their side.1" 7
Another manifestation of biased perception is called the
hostile media phenomenon. Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross, and
Mark R. Lepper demonstrated that perception of bias in media
has a basis in subjective construal. In their study, Vallone et al.
showed the same media coverage of the Beirut Massacre to proArab and pro-Israeli subjects. 6 ' They found that members of
each group perceived identical media coverage to be biased
against their side. 69 In another study of the hostile media
phenomenon, Lee Ross and Andrew Ward had subjects read the
same account of the events surrounding the Clarence ThomasAnita Hill sexual harassment controversy. 70 Pro-Thomas and
pro-Hill subjects both perceived the account as biased against
their side and in favor of the other side.' 71 Vallone et al.
suggested that this disparity in perceptions of bias was due in
part to the subjects effectively "seeing" two different news
programs. 7 2 In other words, the subjects "disagreed about the
very nature of the stimulus they had viewed."' 73
As these studies show, we view the world subjectively, often
in a manner beneficial to our prior beliefs. In interpreting
stimuli, we "perceive things as [we] have been led by experience
or suggestion to expect them to be, and [our] perceptions are
further biased by [our] hopes, fears, needs, and immediate
emotional state.' 74
167 See id.
16 Robert

at 2101-02.
P. Vallone, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, The Hostile Media
Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the
Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577, 580 (1985).
169 Id. at 581. Subjects disagreed in their perceptions of the standard Israel was
held to, the amount of focus on Israel's role in the massacre, and the strength of the
positive and negative cases for Israel. Id. On a nine-point scale, ranging from proArab at one to pro-Israeli at nine, pro-Arab subjects rated the coverage at 6.7, while
pro-Israeli subjects rated the coverage at 2.9. Id.
170 Ross & Ward, Psychological Barriers,supra note 143, at 281-82 (discussing
Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Perceptions of Bias in Response to the "Judge ThomasAnita Hill" Affair (1991) (unpublished manuscript)). The account "suggested that
Thomas' transgression had been real but exaggerated by Hill, and that both had
been less than candid in their testimony" before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id.
at 282. Disinterested subjects (that is, those that did not support Thomas or Hill)
rated the account as "fair and balanced." Id.
171 Id.
172 Vallone et al., supra note 168, at 582.
173 Id.
174 Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note 143, at 636.
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The Illusion of Objectivity

Despite the subjectivity of our perception, we often see
ourselves as more objective and insightful than our peers in a
variety of situations.
Emily Pronin and her colleagues
demonstrated this illusion of asymmetric insight in a battery of
studies of the common feeling that we know others better than
they know themselves, while others do not know us as well as we
know ourselves. 175 Pronin et al. found, for example, that subjects
tended to believe that they knew a roommate better than their
roommate knew them. 176 Similarly, opposing gender, social, and
political groups tended to believe that they knew the opposing
group better than the opposing group knew them. 177 Thus,
liberal and conservative subjects, pro-choice and pro-life subjects,
and men and women all felt that they "knew and understood
their counterparts better than vice versa."178
David Alain Armor found a similar tendency to overestimate
the objectivity of one's own judgment. Armor asked subjects first
to evaluate the general objectivity of their own judgment relative
to others.179 Consistent with the psychological literature on the
tendency to evaluate oneself as unduly above average, ninety-two
percent of subjects in one study evaluated themselves as more
objective than average. 8 0 Armor then asked subjects to answer
various judgment problems that, while having an objectively
correct answer, have elicited biased responses in prior studies. 8
Subjects then indicated the objectivity of their responses, both
absolutely and in relation to their peers.'8 2

Id. at 639.
Id. at 656-57.
177 Id. at 659.
178 Id.
179 David Alain Armor, The Illusion of Objectivity: A Bias in the Perception of
Freedom from Bias 36-37 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California-Los Angeles) (on file with author).
175
171

180 Id. at 46. Armor gave subjects two questionnaires to evaluate perceptions of
self objectivity. Id. The first found -that ninety-two percent of subjects believed
themselves to be more objective than average, while the second found a lesser but
still significant seventy-six percent of respondents believing themselves to be more
objective than average. Id.
' Id. at 37-38. Questions included those that tend to demonstrate various
cognitive biases, such as failures to appreciate base rates and egocentric bias. Id. at
38-43.
182 Id. at 43.
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When comparing subjects' estimated and actual levels of
objectivity, a majority of subjects consistently overestimated how
objective they were in answering the questions.1 8 3 For all but one
of the measures, subjects' "assessments of how objective or how
rational they had been, on both specific and general measures of
assessment, either did not correlate with how objective they had
been, or correlated negatively."1 8 4 Ultimately, Armor concluded,
"[mlost people see themselves as more objective-as more evenhanded, insightful, and less biased-than could really be the
18 5
case."
Indeed, the biased assimilation discussed above stems in
part from a belief in our own objectivity. According to Pronin and
her colleagues, the biased assimilation of new information stems
in part from "[t]he sense that our understanding of situations
and events is veridical."8 6 That is, we construe new information
in line with our previously held beliefs because we perceive those
beliefs to reflect an objectively true understanding of reality.
Because we perceive that our construal of reality is objective,
we also often view our judgments based on that construal as the
rational and reasonable responses to reality. This leads us to
believe that other reasonable people will share our judgments.
The manifestation of this belief is called the "false consensus
effect." The false consensus effect is the tendency for people to
perceive their response to a given stimulus as the common and
reasonable response.
Because we see our response as the
rational reaction to the stimulus, we believe that other rational
people will respond similarly.
In their classic study of the false consensus effect, Lee Ross,
David Greene, and Pamela House asked subjects to wear a
sandwich board that read either "Eat at Joe's" or "Repent"
around a college campus. 8 ' Subjects that accepted and refused
the task both believed that a majority of their peers would make

183
184

Id. at 54.
Id. at 57.

11 Id. at 57-58.

Pronin et al., Eye of the Beholder, supra note 143, at 796.
I' Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The "False Consensus Effect": An
Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 289-94 (1977).
186
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the same decision.1 8 As Ross and his colleagues later argued,
this disparity in response indicated that the subjects were
actually responding to two different construals of the relevant
situation." 9 Those who accepted the task likely anticipated
pleasant responses to their wearing the board, such as peers
thinking they were a good sport for participating in the
experiment, while those that refused likely anticipated negative
responses, such as mockery. Subjects that chose either option
failed to perceive that others might differently construe the
relevant situation in assessing the commonality of their
responses.1 90
Instead, they saw their own responses as
objectively proper and expected others to follow suit.
Thomas Gilovich later demonstrated that the false consensus
effect stemmed from differences in construal. Gilovich asked
subjects whether they preferred 1960s music or 1980s music,
what percentage of their peers would prefer each era, and what
bands they thought of while thinking about these eras.' 9
Consistent with the false consensus effect, individuals believed
that their own preferred era of music would be the more common
preference among their peers. 192 Subjects that preferred 1960s
music and subjects that preferred 1980s music, however, were
essentially not comparing the same eras. Those that preferred
1960s music considered much more appealing exemplars of 1960s
music than did those that preferred 1980s music. 19' Similarly,
subjects that preferred 1980s music thought of much more
appealing exemplars of 1980s music than did those that
preferred 1960s music. 194 Gilovich concluded that "[s]ubjects who
made different choices were shown to have interpreted the two
alternatives quite differently and in ways that reflected the
choices they made." 9 5
8 Id. at 292-93. Specifically, those that wore the sign believed that 62.2
percent of subjects would do the same, while those that did not wear the sign
believed that 67 percent of people would do the same. Id. at 292.
189 Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note 143, at 642.
190 Ross & Ward, Naive Realism, supra note 143, at 112.
191 Thomas Gilovich, Differential Construal and the False Consensus Effect, 59 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 623, 625 (1990).
192 Id. at 626-27. Subjects that preferred 1980s music believed that 67.3 percent
of their peers would similarly prefer 1980s music, while those that preferred 1960s
music believed that 55.7% of their peers would prefer 1980s music. Id. at 626.
113 Id.
194

at 628.

See id.

195 Id.

at 629.
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The Bias Blind Spot

A somewhat obvious corollary to our belief in our own
objectivity is our common inability to spot bias in our own
judgments. Even though few would claim an absolute immunity
from the effects of bias (and might even recognize and
acknowledge past cases of biased judgment), we are unlikely to
identify the operation of bias in any present instant. Along these
lines, Emily Pronin and her colleagues found that people tend to
display a "bias blind spot."196 That is, while we can spot the
effects of bias in others, we often fail to recognize the same bias
in ourselves. In one study, after having various cognitive biases
described to them, subjects consistently saw themselves as less
subject to the biases than their peers, with relevant peer groups
defined as the average American, 197 the subjects' average
classmate, 9 8 and fellow travelers at San Francisco International
Airport. 199

In another study, Pronin et al. administered a fake "social
intelligence test" to pairs of subjects.2 00 After completing the test,
one person in each pair was told that they had "failed," while the
other was told that they had "done well."2 ' The subjects then2
20
rated the validity of the test as a measure of social intelligence.
Each subject was then told of a form of self-serving bias,
specifically, the tendency for people to rate tests on which they
perform well as more valid measures of whatever is being tested
than they do for tests on which they perform poorly.0 3
In line with this tendency, subjects who had "failed" rated
the test as a less valid measure of social intelligence than did
those who had "done well."20 4 When subjects estimated the
extent to which they and their partner-who, recall, had received
the opposite score and had likely given the correspondingly
opposite assessment of social validity-were influenced by self196 Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptionsof
Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369-70
(2002) [hereinafter Pronin et al., BiasBlind Spot].
197 Id. at 370-71.

Id. at 371-72.
9 Id. at 372-74.

'9

200 Id.
201
202
203
204

at 376.
See id.
Id.

Id. at 377.
See id.
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serving bias, Pronin et al. found that both those that had "done
well" and those that had "failed" saw their partner's validity
assessment as much more reflective of self-serving bias than
their own.2 °5 Whether subjects had "failed" (and rated the test as
a poor measure of social intelligence) or "done well" (and rated
the test as an accurate measure of social intelligence), they saw
their own self-serving evaluation of the test as accurate and
objective. It appeared that their partner, however, was unable to
assess the true validity of the test due to the influence of selfserving bias.
As Pronin et al. demonstrate, we are often unable to spot the
operation of cognitive biases in our own judgment. Indeed,
introspection in the search of the distorting influence of bias is
unlikely to lead to uncovering anything, as many cognitive biases
depend on subconscious operation.2 6 Yet even while we may be
blind to cognitive biases, we often fail to recognize the operation
of more obvious experiential biases. We instead see our own life
experiences
as sources of enlightenment into how the world
20 7
is.
really
Joyce Ehrlinger and her colleagues demonstrated this
tendency towards self-experiential enlightenment.
They
presented one group of subjects in their study with a proposed
change in a college's affirmative action policy. 2 8 Subjects then
estimated how either a racial minority or majority student's
opinion of the change would be influenced by that student's
ethnicity. 2 9 Another group of students, consisting entirely of
college varsity and intramural athletes, was presented with a
proposal to open the college varsity weight room to intramural
athletes.2 10 Subjects then considered how either a varsity or
intramural athlete's opinion of the change would be influenced by
his or her athletic status.211

205

Id.

See Pronin et al., Eye of the Beholder, supra note 143, at 783-84.
See id. at 790; Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note
143, at 647.
208 Joyce Ehrlinger, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Peering into the Bias Blind
Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 688 (2005).
209 Id. Whether a subject was to consider the view of a racial majority or
minority student was determined randomly. Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
206

207

ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:231

Both groups displayed a tendency to view the status of those
different from themselves as a significant source of bias.
Caucasian subjects believed that a racial minority student
evaluating a proposed change in a school's affirmative action
plan would be significantly more influenced by her ethnicity than
a Caucasian student, while racial minority subjects believed the
exact opposite. 1 2 At the same time, both Caucasian and racial
minority subjects believed that their own ethnicity would be a
213
source of enlightenment in evaluating the proposed change.
Similarly, both varsity and intramural athletes believed that the
other group's status would bias their evaluation of the proposed
weight room policy, while their own status was a source of
enlightenment. 1 4 Ehrlinger et al. ultimately concluded that
personal connection to an issue resulted in viewing that
connection as a source of enlightenment both in ourselves and
those that agree with us, yet a similar connection in those that
disagree with us is discounted as a source of bias.2 15
2.

Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Judicial Decisionmaking

What naive realism brings to the study of judicial
decisionmaking is an awareness of the subjectivity inherent in
And an appreciation of subjective
judicial decisionmaking.
perception can help us to understand how two judges can look at
the same case and come to different, perhaps even wildly
different, judgments of the proper outcome. Each judge might be
influenced by cognitive, perceptual, and motivational biases.
Judges are not wholly objectively evaluating case facts and
relevant law. Indeed, they cannot be wholly objective in their
assessments and judgments; no judge is privileged with a wholly
objective understanding of the world.
This is not to say that, as a practical matter, subjective
perception renders judging wholly unmoored. If it were the case
that all judges subjectively perceived the world to be radically
different, they would have insufficient common ground to
communicate, much less come to any collective decision. Because
Id.
Id. at 688-89. While minority subjects viewed their ethnicity as a
statistically significant source of enlightenment, Caucasian subjects' similar
tendency was not statistically significant. Id.
214 Id. at 689.
215 Id.
212

2"
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everyone shares so much experience-much of it mundanethere is substantial overlap in how we subjectively perceive the
world. This might be even more the case in a less heterogeneous
group like the federal appellate judiciary.
To take an example, there is likely little disagreement over
the requisite age someone must be to be a congressperson 216: As
the Constitution declares, "No Person shall be a Representative
who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years."2 17
Those of us with the shared experience of learning the English
language are unlikely to perceive much ambiguity in the words of
that clause and are unlikely to construe it to mean anything
substantially different.
However, in areas of ambiguity, especially those about which
there is significant social disagreement, naive realism indicates
that there can be differences in subjective perception. Consider
the studies of the hostile media phenomenon: The subjects in
those studies were looking at the same news coverage of a
controversial issue, but they effectively perceived differing news
coverage. The stimulus was unchanging, just like the clause
setting the minimum age for Congress in the Constitution. Yet
the differing experiences and beliefs of the subjects in the hostile
media phenomenon studies led them to subjectively perceive and
construe that same stimulus differently. In the same manner,
judges can differently construe areas of ambiguity, controversy,
and even discretion; indeed, they might differ over whether
discretion even exists.
Naive realism thus indicates that two judges can differ on
the appropriate outcome of the same case due to their differing
subjective perceptions of the case and law. Consider the issue
areas studied in much of judicial politics literature, such as
search and seizure, sex discrimination, affirmative action, and
environmental regulation.
These are sometimes highly
controversial areas with which a judge-just like everyone elsehas prior beliefs and experiences. When confronted with a case
in these areas, it should not be surprising that judges might be
biased in assimilating the relevant information. Moreover, all
judges are likely biased in assimilating the relevant information.

216 But see Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the
Under-Aged President,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250 (1990).
217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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This might explain why we can see such a persistent relation
between a judge's political party and the way that she tends to
vote.
Just as a judge might vote Democrat because the
Democratic Party's policies are based on how things "really are,"
so too she bases her judicial judgment on how the case "really is."
Both of these judgments are based on the same reality that the
judge has subjectively constructed. The same subjective biases
that influence a judge to decide a case likely overlap with what
influences her to join a particular political party. One way to
think of it is that the judge's membership in the Democratic
Party does not cause her to decide a case in a certain way, but
that her subjective perception is what leads her to both be a
member of the Democratic Party and decide a case in a certain
way.
Further, presidential administrations are likely to pick
judges who see things as they "really are." Those who pick
judges-just like everyone else-have their own subjective
perceptions of the world that they believe to be objective. They
likely want to appoint judges who see the world in the same way.
That is, they want judges who are also "objective" and thus look
for those who share their worldview. Thus, they end up picking
judges who substantially share their subjective construal of
reality. It should thus come as no surprise that these judges can
come to the same judgment about an object as those that
appointed them.
Naive realism also indicates that, although subjectively
perceiving and construing cases before them, judges will often
believe their judgments to be the most objective and rational
ones. For example, a male judge might believe that his gender
allows him to address a female plaintiffs sex discrimination case
dispassionately and objectively. He sees his gender as a source of
enlightenment. A female judge might also believe that her
gender helps her to be more insightful in addressing the same
female plaintiffs case. She sees her gender as a source of
enlightenment as well. Both of these judges would believe that
the experience of living their respective genders has given them
some special insight into the reality of the case. However,
neither judge is objective.
Naive realism thus offers one way to understand the findings
of judicial politics scholarship.
Judges are not partisans,
manipulating law to achieve certain policy preferences. Instead,
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they are human, and the inherent subjectivity of their perception
can lead them to construe cases differently. This subjective
perception is inevitably influenced by bias. And as noted above,
judgments about case outcomes and political party affiliation
likely relate because they are both based on this individual
subjective perception.
Moreover, a liberal judge and a
conservative judge can decide cases differently because they are,
in effect, evaluating different cases. Each thinks that his or her
judgment is the most rational one based on an "objective"
evaluation of the facts. Each believes that he or she is carrying
out his or her duty of deciding cases according to law.
If there is some insight to this argument, and the majority of
judges are sincerely and in good faith trying to dispassionately
review cases and render objectively correct decisions (at least
most of the time), why do we see so many accusations of
illegitimate judicial policymaking? Accusations of biased and
political decisionmaking are not uncommon in public and
academic discussions of judging.
One can even find such
accusations in published opinions, often in dissent.21 8 Naive
218 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1800 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Tihe
rule... that the Court applies to decide this case exists untethered from the written
Constitution. The rule instead depends upon the policy preferences of a majority of
this Court."); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 627 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(alleging that the Court's decision "substitute[d] its own policy preference for that of
Michigan voters"); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 195 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority return[ed] this Court to the days in which
it created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional
purpose ... [and] substitute[d] its policy judgments for the bargains struck by
Congress."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 96 (2000) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting "the present majority's repeated
substitution of its own views of federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by
the Congress and signed by the President"); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
594 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's analysis of [the statute in
question] is motivated by its policy preferences."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgement in
part and dissenting in part) ("Under the guise of the Constitution, this
Court... impart[ed] its own preferences on the States in the form of a complex
abortion code."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 431 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for reading its personal preferences into the Eighth
Amendment in finding imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional); TejadaBatista v. Morales, 424 F.3d 97, 106 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (Carter, J., dissenting) ("The
majority has substituted its own policy for the holding of the United States Supreme
Court."); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 432 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 546
U.S. 303 (2006) (alleging that the opinion of the dissent, as well as two other
circuits, is "unsupported by statutory and historical analysis" and thus "amounts to
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little more than judicial assertion of a policy preference"); Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court
(In re Ellis), 356 F.3d 1198, 1215 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(alleging-after responding to the dissent's arguments-that "nothing is left of the
dissent except strongly voiced policy preferences"); Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d
372, 401 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., dissenting) ("[Tithe majority err[ed] by allowing
its policy preference to corrupt its analysis."); King v. Marriott Int'l Inc., 337 F.3d
421, 428 n.4 (4th Cir. 2003) (interpreting a statute contrarily to another circuit and
noting that the other circuit's "policy preference appeared to drive [its] interpretive
analysis"); United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 412 (2007) (alleging that the majority
"reach[ed] the result consistent with [its] policy preferences" by "rewrit[ing] [a]
statute because it likes it better this way," thus "usurping" the function of the
elected branches of government); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 514
(6th Cir. 2002) (Gilman, J., dissenting) ("Recognizing the right to visit grandchildren
as a fundamental liberty interest ...represents an expansion of previously
recognized fundamental rights and presents the risk of imposing this court's policy
preferences in the guise of the Due Process Clause."); Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche,
274 F.3d 846, 868, 871 (4th Cir. 2001) (Luttig, J., concurring) (criticizing particular
Fourth Circuit decisions and the "intellectually laz[y] and jurisprudentially
misbegotten enterprise of decision by personal policy preference"); Rosmer v. Pfizer,
Inc., 272 F.3d 243, 244 (4th Cir. 2001) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc) ("[T]his dissent's textual analysis represents a thinly-veiled
attack upon diversity jurisdiction[:] The opinion begins with policy, ends with policy,
and sprinkles plenty of policy arguments in between... [and suggests] that the
federal courts are empowered to employ policy arguments to trump the plain
meaning of Congress' words."); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d
639, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), rev'd, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)
(alleging that the majority's focusing on the goals of a statute instead of its text was
motivated by the court's policy preferences); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 999
n.13 (11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accusing
the majority of "eschew[ing] the text of [the statute at question], and [getting]
carried away by considerations of policy"); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Silberman, J.,
dissenting) ("In any event, I can accept the majority's policy preference no more than
I can subscribe to its assertion of discretionary power. I dissent."); Memphis Planned
Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 184 F.3d 600, 602 (6th Cir. 1999) (Keith, J.,
dissenting in the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting the judge's "solemn oath to
uphold the law, not to pervert it to serve personal values or social policy preferences"
and alleging that the majority's upholding of certain restrictions on abortion "does
violence to the state of the law and. . . does so for no other apparent purpose than to
promote its stance on this controversial topic"); Caterpillar, Inc. v. UAW, 107 F.3d
1052, 1057-58 (3d Cir. 1997) (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (alleging that the majority,
in interpreting the statute at question, "has placed its own policy objectives above
plain language"); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1489 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of "substitut[ing] a policy lecture" instead of
"engaging in any legal analysis whatsoever"); Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 588 (3d Cir.
1994) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The majority has usurped the BIA's place and weighed
the relevant factors for itself-apparently in accordance with its own views of drug
and immigration policy."); Dibidale of La., Inc. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d
300, 311 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe majority's policy
argument... is hard to justify except as an expression of judicial preference for a
predetermined result."); League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v.
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realism also offers an insight into this question. Indeed, the real
implications of such an understanding of judicial decisionmaking
are evident when naive realism is considered in a collective
decisionmaking environment, to which I now turn.
C. Individual Subjectivity and Collective Decisionmaking
1.

Making Sense of Those Who Disagree with Us

As the above discussion of subjectivity suggests, accusations
of biased judgment might have some truth to them. But, I argue,
not as much as we commonly think. Just as others are biased,
so, too, are we. Accusations of bias can thus be the ultimate case
of the pot calling the kettle black. We are all biased. None of us
has a monopoly on objectivity. Recognizing as much might be
very beneficial. Unfortunately, we rarely assume situations of
universal partiality and instead ascribe to our opponents the
distorting influence of bias. It is this attribution that can lead to
conflict.
This process has four steps. First, we fail to account for the
possibility that differences in perception might explain differing
judgments. Second, we instead attribute differences in judgment
to the influence of bias. Third, we then tend to falsely polarize
our opponents, seeing them as holding ideological caricatures of
their actual views. Fourth and finally, all of this combines to
create the potential for significant social disagreement,
misunderstanding, misattribution, and conflict. I discuss each of
these in this section.

Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 654 (5th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.,
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Tex., 501 U.S. 419 (1991) ("[Tlhe
majority's decision is less an attempt to interpret congressional intent ... and more
an attempt to effectuate the majority's policy determination. ..

.");

Handeen v.

LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1990) (Magill, J., dissenting)
(alleging that the majority's opinion was based "on its own view of 'public policy'"
and "reject[ing] the idea that this court's own policy preference is a legitimate basis
for reversing" a lower court decision); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 884 F.2d 1343, 1346
(10th Cir. 1989) (Ebel, J., dissenting), rev'd, 498 U.S. 184 (1991) ("[T]he majority
mistakenly has relied upon congressional silence and upon the majority's own policy
desires to abrogate the plain language of the statute."); United States v. Capano, 786
F.2d 122, 134 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., dissenting) (alleging that the majority had
"displace[d] the Congress's policies with [its] own"); G & H Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 714
F.2d 1397, 1406 (7th Cir. 1983) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (alleging that the majority
"overstepped the proper bounds of our review" and "reweighed the evidence ... in
the light of its own policy preferences").
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a.

The FailureTo Account for Differences in Perception
The conflict that arises from differences in perception begins
with the common failure to account for the possibility that other
people perceive and construe the world differently than we do.2 19
In one classic study of the failure to account for differences in
perception, Elizabeth Newton asked half of her subjects to "tap"
the melody of various popular songs and asked the other half of
the subjects to listen to the tapping and identify the tune.22 °
Both the "tappers" and listeners estimated the percentage of
people that would be able to identify the song tapped. 221 The
tappers estimated that, on average, fifty percent of listeners
would be able to identify the song.2 22 However, the actual success
rate was a mere three percent.22 3
Such a disparity seems almost inevitable once one considers
the difficulty of the task. Tappers reported hearing in their
heads the actual tunes as they tapped, sometimes including
lyrics and orchestral embellishments.2 24 For them, the tune
being tapped was clear, even obvious. Yet while the tappers
knew what tune was being tapped and thus could easily imagine
it, the listeners were privy only to monotone taps.22 The tappers
drastically overestimated the ease of identifying the tapped song
because they failed to appreciate how the listeners perceived
their taps.
Another example of the failure to account for others' differing
perceptions is one that is a bit more common. Pronin and Ross
asked young men and women to consider the most recent
romantic breakup that they initiated and that their partner
initiated.22 6 Subjects then rated the clarity with which they and
219 See Ross & Ward, Naive Realism, supra note 143, at 109-10 (noting that
people fail to realize that they and others experience "different events, or at
least.., different social constructions of those events"); see also Ross & Ward,
PsychologicalBarriers,supra note 143, at 278.
220 See Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note
143, at 64344 (discussing Elizabeth Newton, Overconfidence in the Communication of Intent:
Heard and Unheard Melodies (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University)).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 644.

223

Id.

Id. at 643.
Id.
226 See Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note 143, at 646
(discussing Emily Pronin & Lee Ross, Two Views of Romantic Break-Ups: Biased
224

225
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their partner communicated their respective intentions.22 7 In
cases where the subject initiated the breakup, they perceived
their communications to be much more clear "and less
characterized by 'mixed signals'" than cases where his or her
partner initiated the breakup. 28 As Pronin and Ross concluded,
the subjects "appeared to have some difficulty in separating what
that [sic] they thought they had said, or perhaps what they felt
and had intended to convey, from that which they had actually
229
communicated to the other party."
b.

The Attribution of Bias

When we are confronted with a judgment opposite of our
own, we must somehow account for how the individual espousing
this judgment came to their opposing judgment. Because we
believe that we came to our own judgment objectively, "other
actors' differing views and responses must reflect something
other than a natural, unmediated perception of, and reaction to,
that objective reality. 23 ° Instead of attributing disagreement on
an issue to the possibility of differences in construal, we often
instead move straight to attributions of bias.
There is significant evidence of the tendency for individuals
to attribute bias to those that disagree with them.2 3 1 For
example, Glenn D. Reeder and his colleagues have found
widespread attribution of negative motives by opposing sides in a
conflict. In one study, supporters of the Iraq War attributed
positive and altruistic motivations to President Bush, such as
"self-defense" and "aiming to do good."232 Opponents, however,
cited more aggressive, self-serving, and hidden motivations, such

Perceptions of the Clarity of Intimate
manuscript)).

Communications (1999) (unpublished

227 See id.

Id.
Id.
23' Ross & Ward, Psychological Barriers,supra note 143, at 280.
2"1 Such attributions of bias are found in some of the studies already discussed.
Pronin et al.'s study of perceived validity of social intelligence tests found that
subjects were quick to attribute self-serving bias to those that had disagreed with
them on the validity of the test. Pronin et al., Bias Blind Spot, supra note 196, at
377.
22 Glenn D. Reeder, John B. Pryor, Michael J. A. Wohl & Michael L. Griswell,
On Attributing Negative Motives to Others Who Disagree with Our Opinions, 31
228
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as "controlling Iraq's oil." 23 3 These attributions were not limited
to the President; subjects on both sides attributed biased motives
to those on the opposing side as well.2 34 Subjects also saw their
opponents as blind to the realities of the situation and to their
own biased motivations.2 3 5 In a similar study, Reeder et al.
studied opposing sides on the issues of gay marriage and
abortion. Subjects attributed selfish motivations to members of
the opposing side and saw their opponents as more likely to have
a "hidden agenda. '236 And again, subjects perceived those on the
opposing side to be blind to their own motivations.23 7
In a study of actual union-management negotiations, Robert
J. Robinson and Raymond A. Friedman found that disparities in
perception resulted in the two sides perceiving biased caricatures
of the other side:
[Wiorkers emerge as suspicious of management's motives,
believing that management is attempting to exploit them, and
underestimate the concern that managers report having for
worker welfare and for issues which concern workers, not to
mention the simple necessity of trying to keep the company
profitable and therefore viable. Managers on the other hand see
workers as generally sincere but illogical and hostile, unwilling
to consider mitigating facts in the form of a causal account, or
willing to take positions which might drive the organization into
bankruptcy. 23For
managers, union representatives are thus
8
unreasonable.

Both managers and union representatives thus tended "to
construe the other side in terms of extremism and ideological
239
rigidity.
In short, opposing sides on controversial issues tend to
attribute invidious motives to those on the opposing side. Yet, as
discussed in the next subsection, perceptions of difference are
often overblown, and two sides often share many motivations and
values.
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Id. at 1507.
See id.
Robinson & Friedman, supra note 147, at 322-23.
Id. at 324.
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The False Polarizationof Opposing Sides
Attribution of bias then leads to false polarization. False
polarization is the tendency for individuals, once they have
attributed a particular disagreement to bias, to perceive the
opposing side as influenced or even dictated by the same bias
across other issues. In short, we tend to see our opponents, as
well as those who agree with us, as ideologically consistent. At
the same time, we tend to feel as though we alone are privy to
the nuances and difficulties of the issue.2 4 ° This leads to a
perception of extremity and unreasonableness in those that
disagree with us,241 which hinders the potential for resolution of
the actual conflict.
Social psychologists have demonstrated false polarization in
a variety of contexts.24 2 In one of the primary studies of false
polarization, Robert J. Robertson and his colleagues asked prolife and pro-choice subjects2 43 a variety of questions to adjudge
the subjects' own views on abortion as well as the subjects' views
Robinson et al.
of their pro-life and pro-choice peers.244
c.

240 See Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding,supra note 143, at 651
("Both sides in the conflict believe that although their own views reflect the
complexity, ambiguity, and contradictions of objective reality, the views of the other
side have been dictated and distorted by ideology, self-interest, and other biases.").
241 See id. ("These attributions [of bias] lead the conflicting partisans to see the
other side as extreme, unreasonable, and unreachable.").
242 False polarization was found in the union-management study discussed in
the previous section. See Robinson & Friedman, supra note 147, at 324 (noting that
the managers and union representatives "are prone to overestimate the 'gap'
between the two sides").
243 In
their study, Robinson et al. were particularly interested in false
polarization among partisans. Thus, subjects to their studies included members of
pro-life and pro-choice student groups and individuals who identified themselves as
either "strongly pro-choice" or "strongly pro-life." Robinson et al., supra note 144, at

406.

Id. In particular, Robinson et al. presented one group of subjects with six
hypothetical situations of a woman faced with the decision of whether to have an
abortion. Id. Three of the situations were meant to be relatively sympathetic, such
as pregnancy resulting from rape, while the other three were meant to be relatively
unsympathetic, such as a pregnancy resulting from a casual affair. Id. Each subject
indicated how sympathetic they felt for the woman in each case, the typicality of
each hypothetical case, and the bases for their beliefs about abortion (such as moral,
pragmatic, and political considerations). Id. They then estimated the responses that
they thought the typical pro-life and typical pro-choice partisans in their college
would give to the same questions. Id. Another group of subjects evaluated the
likelihood of various possible outcomes from legal restrictions on abortion, such as
abortions becoming practically available only for the wealthy and an increase in the
number of adoptions and gave estimates as to various factual questions regarding
244
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unsurprisingly found that pro-life and pro-choice subjects indeed
possessed differing views on abortion. For example, pro-choice
subjects were relatively more sympathetic towards women facing
the decision of whether to have an abortion,24 5 and they believed
that the potential negative consequences of legally restricting the
availability of abortions were much more likely than their pro-life
counterparts. 246 However, both pro-life and pro-choice subjects
persistently overestimated the extremity of those with whom
they agreed and disagreed.
For example, while pro-choice
subjects expressed greater sympathy for women facing the
decision of whether to have an abortion, pro-life subjects were
significantly more sympathetic towards those same women than
either the pro-choice or pro-life subjects estimated.2 47 In other
words, both pro-choice and pro-life subjects underestimated the
level of sympathy the pro-life subjects would express towards
women facing the decision of whether to have an abortion.
In another study, Robinson et al. asked self-identified liberal,
conservative, and moderate subjects to evaluate the truthfulness
of various statements regarding the Howard Beach incident and
then to estimate the typical response of their liberal or
conservative peers.248
Consistent with Robinson et al.'s
expectations, liberal subjects evaluated the Howard Beach
incident in a manner slightly more negative towards the white
perpetrators than did conservative subjects.2 49
However,
conservative, liberal, and neutral subjects all "significantly
overestimated the extent to which the conservatives would
interpret the Howard Beach events in ways that blamed the
Black victim and exonerated the White perpetrators. 2 5 ° Indeed,
not a single conservative subject displayed the views expected by
all three subject groups. 251
This resulted in a significant
abortion such as the percentage of abortions that occur before the tenth week of
pregnancy. Id. These subjects then estimated what they thought typical pro-life and
pro-choice partisans in their class would give to the same questions. Id.
245

Id.

See id. at 408.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 410. In the Howard Beach incident, a black man was struck by a car
while fleeing from a group of white men; some, but not all, of the man's pursuers
were tried and convicted. Id.
249 Id. at 411.
246
247
245

250

Id.

Id. at 412. Similarly, only three of twenty-three liberal subjects displayed the
interpretation expected by conservatives. Id.
25
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overestimation of the differences between liberals and
conservatives on this issue. And as further evidence of the
attribution of bias discussed in the previous section, all subjects
believed that people on all sides of the issue-that is, those who
both agreed and disagreed with the subject-"had been heavily
influenced by ideology and relatively uninfluenced by
evidence."252 Robinson et al. concluded that while subjects
differed in their construals of the Howard Beach incident, "the
magnitude of these real construal differences was far exceeded by
the magnitude of the differences assumed by the relevant
partisans."253
False polarization even infects the evaluation of the
importance of our core values to those that disagree with us.
Such attributions of divergent values are not uncommon in social
conflict. 4 John R. Chambers and his colleagues demonstrated
as much in their studies of intergroup perception of values. In
one study, Chambers et al. presented subjects with strong
opinions on abortion with four value statements, two pro-life and
two pro-choice. 255 Subjects indicated their views-in favor or in
opposition-towards these values and the importance of these
values to their own positions.25 Subjects then estimated the
same for an opposing partisan.2 57

As expected, the pro-life

subjects rated the pro-life values to be relatively more important
than did the pro-choice subjects, and vice versa. 258 Further, prolife and pro-choice participants differed in their actual positions
on value issues.259
However, the subjects' perceived disagreement did not reflect
their actual disagreement. Pro-choice subjects perceived relative
agreement on pro-life values and attributed the disagreement
between the two sides to pro-life partisans' lower valuation of
252

Id. at 413.

253

Id.

Ross & Ward, Naive Realism, supra note 143, at 128 ("Parties involved in
conflict often attribute the existing stalemate to differences in basic values and/or
incompatibility of basic interests.").
255 John R. Chambers, Robert S. Baron & Mary L. Inman, Misperceptions in
Intergroup Conflict, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2006).
256 Id. The values presented were "women's reproductive rights," "freedom from
government interference in private lives," "the value of human life," and "a moral
code of sexual conduct." Id.
257 Id.
254

258

Id.

211 Id. at 39-40.
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pro-choice values. 260
Contrarily, pro-life subjects perceived
relative agreement on pro-choice values and attributed the
disagreement to pro-choice partisans' lower valuation of pro-life
values.26 ' In both of these cases, subjects overestimated the
disagreement between their own side and the other side on the
values that were of greatest importance to themselves.26 2 Not
only did the subjects disagree over what they actually disagreed
about, but they estimated the extent of their disagreement to be
much greater than it actually was.
Chambers et al. replicated this study with Republican and
Democratic subjects evaluating values important to each party,
namely "crime prevention," "a strong military," "funding of public
education," and "eliminating social inequalities." 26 3
Again,
Republican and Democratic subjects believed that the values
traditionally associated with their own party were of relatively
greater importance, and subjects were relatively more favorable
towards the values associated with their own party. 264 But again,
both Republican and Democratic subjects presumed that the two
sides disagreed over the issues that were most important to their
own side; Republican subjects believed that they disagreed with
Democrats over the importance of crime prevention and military
strength, while Democratic subjects believed that they disagreed
with Republicans over the importance of public education and
equality. 265 Further, both Republican and Democratic subjects
overestimated the degree to which they actually disagreed on the
issues most important to their side.2 66 As Chambers et al.
concluded, "[p]artisans seemed oblivious to the possibility that
their adversaries shared many of their preferences and values,
but differed primarily in how they prioritized those values."26 7
d.

Naive Realism and Conflict

It is when the perception of bias in others is coupled with the
illusion of our own personal objectivity that naive realism
illuminates one basis for the creation, exacerbation, and
260

Id. at 40.
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Id. at 42.
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perpetuation of social conflict. 26' The collision of these two
considerations is apt to lead to misunderstanding and conflict
between individuals and between groups. "Misunderstanding,
mistrust, escalation of conflict, and unwarranted pessimism
about the ability to find common ground with those with whom
we disagree become likely consequences when we attribute
disagreements and bias not to ordinary psychological processes
but to evil strategic designs or the unique traits of our
<opponents.' "269
Dacher Keltner and Robert J. Robinson have tested the
ability of individuals to resolve conflicts in cases of actual and
assumed ideological disagreement. In one study, subjects were
placed in groups of two where (1) the subjects were unaware of
actual political differences between them, (2) the subjects were
aware of actual political differences between them, or (3) the
subjects were told that there were political differences between
them when in fact there were no actual differences. ° The
groups were then asked to allocate a hypothetical budget for
various AIDs programs.27 1
Keltner and Robinson found that the groups where the
subjects were aware of political disagreement-actual or
imagined-took longer to reach an agreement on the budget than
did the groups where the group members were unaware of their
actual political disagreement. 272 This longer time was not the
result of more conscientious or nuanced negotiation; the length of
the negotiation was positively correlated with perceptions that
little agreement was reached and that the subject's partner was
neither constructive nor cooperative. 3 In addition, subjects told
of actual or imagined political disagreement assumed some
amount of ideological consistency in their partner's views, as they
expected to disagree with the same partner on other issues.27
There also was no real difference between groups where the
subjects were told of actual political disagreement and groups
where the subjects were told of political disagreement when no
See Pronin et al., UnderstandingMisunderstanding,supra note 143, at 636.
Pronin et al., Bias Blind Spot, supra note 196, at 379.
270 Dacher Keltner & Robert J. Robinson, Imagined Ideological Differences in
Conflict Escalationand Resolution, 4 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 249, 251 (1993).
271 Id. at 252.
272 Id. at 252-53.
213 Id. at 253.
268

269
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disagreement actually existed.27
Even these imagined
ideological differences can exacerbate and exaggerate actual
social conflicts.2 76
Of course, "some conflicts do reflect irreconcilable differences
in the parties' values, interests, needs, or objectives."27 7 Yet
naive realism illustrates the very real risk of misunderstanding
those with whom we disagree. And, as illustrated above, once we
attribute disagreement to bias, the two sides can be driven even
farther apart on a slew of other issues. This creates the
perception of intractable ideological conflict and presents little
hope for resolution. A better understanding of how this conflict
arises, as well as how it can be mitigated, is essential to
addressing all kinds of social disputes. As Lee Ross and Andrew
Ward argue, "many and perhaps even most conflicts are far more
tractable than they seem; ... disputants are often constrained
not by objective circumstances but by cognitive, perceptual, or
motivational biases; and ... incompatibilities in basic needs,
interests, and values are often more apparent than real."27
2.

Understanding the Perception of Partisan Judging in
Judicial Politics

Consider again a male judge and female judge addressing a
female plaintiffs sex discrimination case. Suppose they are
sitting on an appellate panel and come to differing judgments as
to the proper outcome of the plaintiffs case. The judges likely
believe that they have objectively and dispassionately assessed
the evidence and come to the most rational judgment based on
that evidence. Yet each judge sees that his or her colleague has
somehow come to the opposite judgment while looking at the
same evidence. They then must somehow account for how a
seemingly rational person could come to such a seemingly
irrational judgment.
As demonstrated above, they are unlikely to attribute their
disagreement to differences in perception. Yet differences in
subjective perception might very well account for their differing
judgments. Each judge is likely to have some prior beliefs about
Id.
False polarization, discussed above, provides another ground for such
imagined disagreement.
277 Ross & Ward, Naive Realism, supra note 143, at 129.
278 Id.
275
276
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and experiences (judicial or otherwise) with sex discrimination.
Perhaps the male judge was falsely accused of sexual harassment
in the past and thus, as a result, might be more doubtful of sex
discrimination claims. And the female judge, after spending
much of her early career in a male-dominated law firm, might be
more attuned to the more subtle forms of sex discrimination in
the modern workplace. These factors, as well as a wealth of
others, result in a general belief towards the issue of sex
discrimination. And any new information is construed in light of
that belief. Thus, our judges' beliefs and experiences color the
ways they perceive this new case, and they might very well come
to differing construals of the case. Just as there was no one
"game" for the Princeton and Dartmouth fans in the Hastorf and
Cantril study, there might be no one "case" for these judges.
Instead of realizing the possible differences in subjective
perception, naive realism indicates that our hypothetical judges
will likely attribute their disagreement to the distorting
influence of bias on the other judge. While each would likely see
his or her own gender and experience as an enlightening
influence, they are likely to see the other judge's as a source of
bias. While the male judge thinks his gender allows him to
dispassionately assess the case, he perceives his female
colleague's gender and past experience as blinding her to the
reality of the case. And the female judge would think similarly.
Yet neither judge's experience has blessed him or her with the
ability to assess the case dispassionately; they are both biased.
Because both of our judges perceive that their colleague is
biased in his or her decision, they are unlikely to come to any sort
of resolution of their disagreement. Particularly when the issues
are controversial, our judges might falsely polarize and see their
colleague as irrational across a number of issues.
Naive realism thus might illustrate what is really going on
in some of the cases where politicians, academics, public figures,
and even other judges accuse judges of deciding a case solely on
policy preferences. These accusations stem from disagreement
between how the judge acted and how the accuser thinks the
judge should have acted. And instead of being based on actual
disagreement, these accusations often imply improper biased
behavior (deciding ideologically, imposing policy preferences,
etc.). That is, the judge decided the case a certain way only
because she is a woman, Republican, Catholic, etc.
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Yet naive realism indicates that these accusations are often
misplaced. While perhaps containing some accuracy about how a
particular characteristic of the judge influenced her subjective
perception, such accusations ignore the possibility of differing
subjective perception. Those making such accusations implicitly
assert that they have objectively and dispassionately assessed
the case and come to the most rational judgment on its proper
outcome. What they fail to realize is that the judge might
perceive a case differently, yet at the same time the judge would
believe that her perception is objective. Thus, while one person
might see a judge as illegitimately deciding a case in line with
that judge's political preferences, that judge might have
subconsciously perceived and construed the relevant facts and
law such that the decision was instead a vote for what the judge
sincerely believed to be the only proper outcome. Just like the
judges themselves, those that accuse judges of biased decisions
are subject to the same distorting influence of bias, and they too
are not privy to an objective assessment of the world.
This is not to say that actual disagreement does not exist. It
undoubtedly does. Even in cases where we wrongly perceive
those that disagree with us to be extreme and significantly
influenced by bias, there is likely some actual basis for
disagreement. But the negative manifestations of naive realism
prevent us from recognizing and appreciating the actual grounds
for disagreement. Instead of realizing that we share much in
common with those that disagree with us, and perhaps differ
only in the way we have prioritized shared values, we see our
opponents as ideologues.
This frustrates the potential for
resolving the existing conflict. In a similar vein, I am not saying
that judges never engage in the illegitimate behavior they are
accused of, but I suspect it is likely not nearly as common as
these accusations would have one believe.
D. A Note on Dissensus, Collegiality,and OvercomingNaive
Realism
While the above discussion of disparities in perception
leading to intractable conflict might indicate that we should
expect widespread dissensus on the courts of appeals, any casual
observer of the courts knows that such dissensus is the exception
more than it is the norm. Yet this is not necessarily the case;
naive realism does not inevitably lead to dissensus. First, as
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discussed above, it is likely that in many cases judges' common
experiences lead them to subjectively perceive a case in the same
way, or at least similarly enough that there is no significant
disagreement in the proper outcome.
Thus, differences in
subjective perception that lead to conflict are not necessarily
found in every case.
The courts of appeals, though, also have a unique
institutional factor that aids them in overcoming dissensus.
Namely, the collegial environment of the courts of appeals is very
much the kind of environment suited to overcome the adverse
effects of naive realism. Robinson et al.'s research "suggests the
value of candid, relatively informal discussions (and of
developing personal relations and settings that encourage such
candor), discussions in which participants talk about their
factual assumptions and the complexities of their values rather
than simply defending their positions."27 9 The little research on

the subject has indicated that such frank and open discussion is
important in overcoming conflict stemming from naive realism.
After finding evidence of exacerbated social conflict from
imagined ideological differences, Keltner and Robinson tested
whether individuals with "extreme ideological differences "280
could better resolve conflict after openly discussing their actual
views. In one study, opposing subjects recruited from college proabortion rights and anti-abortion rights groups were placed in
groups of two and asked to identify items of agreement on five
issues related to the abortion debate. 8 1 While all groups were
informed of their partners' actual disagreement on abortion,
some groups were given time before the task to "describe the
282
values that are most central to [their] position on abortion."
Keltner and Robinson found that subjects who discussed
their values before beginning the task reached more
comprehensive and integrative agreements and saw their
...Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 416; see also Robinson & Friedman, supra
note 147, at 324 (noting "the value of facilitated candid discussions, in which
participants are guided through talking about their factual assumptions and the
complexities of their values, rather than simply defending their positions").
20 Keltner & Robinson, supra note 270, at 253.
21 Id. at 254. The five issues were (1) "whether or not the fetus should be tested
for viability," (2) "the acceptable grounds for having an abortion," (3) "the status of
public funding of abortion," (4) "provisions for informed consent," and (5) "the
legitimacy and potential role of parental consent." Id.
282

Id.
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partners as more cooperative than the groups that did not
discuss their values.8 3 Keltner and Robinson concluded that
individuals could counteract imagined ideological difference by
disclosing their actual views before discussing the relevant
issue. 28' They ultimately recommend that partisans involved in
ideological conflicts, "first, avoid attaching ideological labels to
opponents, issues, or positions; and second, when ideological
differences are relevant to the negotiation, as they inevitably can
be, ensure that both sides inform each other of their actual
2 85

views."

Thus, even in cases of differing subjective perception, actual
ideological agreement, and the potential for false polarization
and conflict, open and amicable discussion of real values and
views can overcome the potentially debilitative effect of naive
realism. Thus, where such interaction occurs, we can expect that
the negative manifestations of naive realism will be eliminated or
at least mitigated. Further, if such conditions are absent or
break down, we can expect the negative manifestations of naive
realism to surface.
As we have already seen, naive realism can explain how two
judges can come to different judgments of the proper outcome for
the same case. Further, naive realism can help us understand
when and why these judges can disagree and accuse each other of
engaging in illegitimate behavior. Finally, we have also seen
how naive realism can explain the relation between political
party and judicial decision. In this final section, I briefly argue
that the collegial environment of the courts of appeals plays a
significant role in overcoming the negative manifestations of
naive realism. That is, the collegial environment of the courts of
appeals explains, at least in part, why judges agree so often.
Collegiality has gone relatively unexplored in the judicial
politics literature.8 6 However, a few authors have discussed the
role that collegiality might play, as well as described the

mnId. at 255.
'84

Id. at 259.

25 Id. at 260.
286 See Harry T. Edwards,
The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, Effects] (noting
that "discussions of collegiality, mostly by judges, have been brief and suggestive,
usually introduced only in passing").
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Harry T. Edwards defined collegiality:
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As former Chief Judge

[Jiudges have a common interest, as members of the judiciary,
in getting the law right, and that, as a result, we are willing to
listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of
civility and respect. Collegiality is a process that helps to create
the conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all points of
view to be aired and considered. Specifically, it is my contention
that collegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role
of partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of
differing perspectives and philosophies to communicate with,
listen to, and ultimately influence one another in constructive
and law-abiding ways.28 8
In collegial environments, "divergent views are more likely
to gain a full airing in the deliberative process-judges go back
and forth in their deliberations over disputed and difficult issues
until agreement is reached."2 89 Judges in a collegial environment
"can admit and recognize their own and other judges' fallibility
29
and intellectual vulnerabilities.""
They engage in "careful,

collective exploration and consideration of the different views of
each judge," allowing "judges accurately and honestly, and
without hesitation, to identify what is common ground and what
is not, all ... while remaining open to revising their views."291

Some of the judges that have spoken on the issue indicate
that their courts have such collegial interaction. Again, Judge
Edwards has been a vocal proponent of the influence of
collegiality, arguing that it plays a central role in appellate
decisionmaking.292 The judges on his court "spend a great deal of
time listening to each other's views and considering arguments
each of [them] makes."29 3 They "listen[] to and tak[e] seriously
the views of [their] colleagues" and approach these exchanges
"respectfully" and "with open minds."29 4 They "deliberate with

217

Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 15, at 1359. For a sample of such

discussions, see sources cited in Edwards, Effects, supra note 286, at 1641 n.10.
28 Edwards, Effects, supra note 286, at 1645 (footnote call numbers omitted).
289 Id. at 1646.
290 Id. at 1650.
291 Id. at 1651.
292Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 15, at 1358-60.
' Id. at 1360.
294 Id. at 1361.
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one another, and are affected by that deliberation in valuable
ways."295

Other studies of judges have found similar views. In his
study of the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, J. Woodford
Howard, Jr. found that the judges felt "that either sufficient
collegiality existed on the courts or as much existed as could be
expected under current circumstances. 2 96 While the judges
indicated a desire for more collegial deliberation to improve
written opinions, they were satisfied with the amount of
collegiality when it came to decisions.2 97 Even on the thenimmense Fifth Circuit,2 98 judges worked together to come to their
decisions. Judges on the Fifth Circuit circulated slip opinions
before publication, and "[c]ertain judges took it upon themselves
to criticize slip opinions in order to iron out errors and
inconsistencies."2 99 These criticisms would result in "an exchange
of views among interested members." °° And when a judge on the
Fifth Circuit would reverse course midway through an opinion,
they would, as one judge put it, "burn the phones up."3°1
These conditions described by Judge Edwards and others are
exactly the kind that can lead to two parties recognizing actual
causes of disagreement and preempt the misattribution of bias.
As Ross and Ward argue, it is not until two parties "carefully and
explicitly probe their two divergent sets of assumptions and
construals" that they will come to realize that they have indeed
responded to, effectively, different events. 0 2 "Even if such
discussions do not lead to consensus about policy, they could at
least reduce stereotyping (by neutral observers as well as by the
partisans themselves) and allow the partisans to see the other

11 Id. at 1370.
296 J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 211

(1981). However, one judge did indicate that the courts were "pretty individual, not
collegial." Id. at 220.
2
See id. at 211 ("[N]o one thought that insufficient deliberation led to faulty
decisions.").
29 Howard completed his study before the 1981 split of the Fifth Circuit into the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See id. at xix n.a.
Id. at 216.
300 Id.
301

Id. at 215 (quoting an interviewed judge).
Ross & Ward, PsychologicalBarriers,supra note 143, at 278.
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side as less of an unreasoning, unreasonable, ideologically driven
monolith."303
Further, dissensus can be understood if there is a lack of
collegiality when particular issues arise. As Judge Edwards has
stated, judges in an uncollegial environment may "tend to follow
a 'party line' and adopt unalterable positions on the issues before
them. This is especially true in the hard and very hard cases
that involve highly controversial issues."" 4 If collegiality is
lacking on a court, among certain judges, or even breaks down in
particular cases, the open exchange of views that mitigates naive
realism will be hindered and dissensus becomes more likely.
Thus, one takeaway from the judicial politics research might
be the need to encourage collegiality in the courts of appeals.
This encouragement could take many forms. Perhaps most
obviously would be placing a premium on the personality of
judicial nominees. We would want judges that have the ability to
engage with their colleagues and be open to the give and take of
collective decisionmaking. Indeed, naive realism suggests that
our judges should have a healthy humility as to their confidence
in their judgments.0 Regardless of how much they might think
they have made a rational judgment based on objective
evaluation of all relevant evidence, there is always the possibility
that the subjectivity of their perception has somehow biased their
judgment. By embracing this uncertainty and then looking to
the judgments of their colleagues, judges might better be able to
address the issues before them.
Further, while some judicial politics scholars have suggested
reforms to the structure of appellate panels to ensure that all
panels are "ideologically mixed," we might instead want to look to
reforms that encourage collegial interactions between our judges.
One danger of making sure that every panel contains a
Republican judge and a Democratic judge is that, once given
these labels, the judges will act much more like a stereotypically
Republican or Democratic judge. Instead of mixing panels,

303 Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 416.
304 Edwards, Effects, supra note 286, at 1645.

0 This approach thus might complement other work that has suggested the

importance of judicial humility. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADiCALS IN ROBES 27-30,
35 (2005) (presenting minimalism as a humble approach to the law); Suzanna

Sherry, Judges of Character,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 799 (2003) (arguing for
the value of humility in judging).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:231

legislation to reform appellate courts might instead aim to create
smaller circuits with fewer judges to encourage repeated
interaction, investigate technology that would further bridge the
geographic gaps between judges, or even consolidate the
chambers of circuits so that judges work in the same building
and hopefully interact more often. These are, of course, merely
suggestions at this point, but if collegiality does have such a
strong value in encouraging positive deliberation and
decisionmaking, then they are worth investigating further.
CONCLUSION
The recent entry of the empirical study of judicial
decisionmaking into legal scholarship is an important
development and one that has great potential for illuminating a
number of traditional legal debates. However, as I have shown,
judicial politics' understanding of judicial behavior is somewhat
dubious. By taking a psychological approach to judicial behavior,
we might better understand how our judges decide cases. With
that knowledge, we can then explore the normative implications
of actual judicial behavior.
Such a psychological approach can also inform existing ways
of exploring judging. Indeed, on a general level, the insights of
naive realism into judging are similar to insights suggested by a
variety of approaches to the law. What a psychological approach
brings to such discussions is a more formalized, empirical basis
for such theorizing. °6 For instance, the evidence of inevitable
individual subjectivity supports criticisms of the possibility of
determinacy or certainty in law. The need to recognize the
subjectivity of perception bolsters arguments that judges should
be conscious of the perspectives they take in approaching cases. 0 7
Naive realism further indicates that the approach of the more

Cf Simon, Psychological Model, supra note 8, at 25 (offering a psychological
model of judicial decisionmaking that "incorporate[s] some of [Duncan] Kennedy's
insights into a more formal structure, that is cognitively realistic and based, at least
in part, on empirical findings"). Complementing fields such as legal realism, critical
legal studies, and law and postmodernism with empirical and theoretical insights of
social psychology is also in line with the general suggestion of the behavioral realists
that law and legal decisionmaking should be based upon behavioral assumptions
drawn from the social sciences. See supra text accompanying note 5.
307 See generally Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10
(1987).
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"idiosyncratic" legal realists might not be as easily dismissed as
some recent scholarship has suggested. These are only a few of
the ways in which a better understanding of judicial behavior
might inform the way we approach judging and the law.
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